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Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between
Trade Secrets and the First Amendment
PAMELA SAMUELSON*
INTRODUCTION
Preliminary and permanent injunctions are routinely granted in
trade secret cases without offending the First Amendment, and this is as
it should be. In the ordinary trade secret case, the misappropriator of
trade secrets is an errant licensee,' a faithless employee or former
employee,2 an abuser of confidences,3 a trickster who uses deceit or other
wrongful means to obtain the secrets,' or a knowing recipient of
misappropriated information who is free-riding on the trade secret
developer's investment In such cases, injunctions merely require parties
to abide by express or implicit agreements they have made, to respect the
confidences under which they acquired secrets, and to refrain from
wrongful conduct vis-A-vis the secrets.6
On rare occasions, defendants invoke the First Amendment as a
defense to claims of trade secrecy misappropriation.7 There is no
* Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law and Information, University of
California at Berkeley. This paper was supported by NSF Grant No. SES-9979 852. It is a derivative
work of a draft article entitled "Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First
Amendment" posted on my website in March 2003 that has been cited in some articles published since
then. I wish to thank Julie Cohen, Rebecca Eisenberg, Howard Freedland, Tait Graves, Paul Heald,
Eddan Katz, Mark Lemley, David McGowan, Kurt Opsahl, Robert Post, Jason Schultz, Eugene
Volokh, and participants in workshops at Boalt Hall and University of Michigan and Georgetown
University Law Schools for insightful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
i. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 77 F.3d 677, 67 8- 7 9 (2d Cir. 1996); Tracer
Research Corp. v. Nat'l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994).
2. See, e.g., Comprehensive Tech. Int'l. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730,732 (4th Cir. 1993);
SI Handling Sys. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 244, 1251 (3d Cir. 1985).
3. See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1987); Roberts v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1978).
4. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. Int'l. Bus. Machs. Corp., 5io F.2d 894, 897 (ioth Cir. 1975); Univ.
Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518,528 (5th Cir. 1974).
5. See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1197-98 (5th Cir. 1986);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 834 F. Supp. 477,481 (D. Mass. 1992).
6. Parts L.A and IV.B explain why trade secret cases generally do not pose First Amendment
concerns.
7. See, e.g.. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 51o U.S. 1315, 1315 (1994). The First Amendment trade secrecy
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consensus in the caselaw or law review literature about whether trade
secrets are categorically immune (or nearly so) from First Amendment
scrutiny and whether preliminary injunctions forbidding disclosure of
informational secrets should be considered prior restraints on speech.8
This Article addresses these and related questions and offers a set of
principles for mediating the tensions that occasionally arise between
trade secrets and the First Amendment.
Part I considers why conflicts between trade secrecy law and the
First Amendment have thus far been relatively rare.9 Many trade secret
injunctions do not raise First Amendment concerns either because of the
nature of the secrets or of the conduct that trade secret law regulates.
Various limiting principles of trade secrecy law mediate most free-
speech-related tensions likely to arise when someone wants to disclose
information that another claims as a trade secret.
Part II suggests that conflicts between trade secret and First
Amendment interests may increase in the upcoming years. The increased
use of mass-market licenses aimed at maintaining secrecy for information
that would otherwise be lawful to acquire and disclose is one source of
greater tension. Another arises from proposals to strengthen trade secret
rights to safeguard them from threats posed by the Internet. DVD Copy
Control Association v. Bunner ° illustrates these trends. If trade secret
cases are discussed infra Part IV.
8. The commentator who most clearly adopts the categorical immunity position is Andrew
Beckerman-Rodau. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash
Between Intellectual Property and the First Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & Er. L.J. 1, 5 (2001) ("[T]rade secrets, despite any expressive component,
should be treated as property that falls outside the domain of the First Amendment."); see also Bruce
T. Atkins, Trading Secrets In the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1151, 1151 (arguing for strengthening trade secret rights to ensure that they are
adequately protected against Internet exposure); Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the
First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. Ioo3, oo6
(2ooo) (critical of caselaw in which First Amendment defenses have been successful); Adam W.
Johnson, Injunctive Relief in the Internet Age: The Battle Between Free Speech and Trade Secrets, 54
FE. COMM. L.J. 517, 536 (2002) (offering a three-part test for balancing trade secret and First
Amendment interests that weighs heavily in favor of trade secret owners); Franklin B. Goldberg,
Recent Developments: Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 271, 271 (2001) (questioning
decisions applying the prior restraint doctrine of the First Amendment in trade secret cases). At the
opposite end of the spectrum is David Greene. David Greene, Trade Secrets, the First Amendment and
the Challenges of the Internet Age, 23 HASTINGS CoMm. & ENT. L.J. 537, 552-55 (2001) (proposing four-
part test for preliminary injunctions heavily weighted in favor of First Amendment interests); see also
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases,
48 DUKE L.J. 147, 229-31 (i999) (preliminary injunctions in trade secret cases may raise serious First
Amendment concerns); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697, 739-48 (2003) (criticizing recent
caselaw analyzing First Amendment defenses in trade secret and wiretap cases).
9. See, e.g., ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 12.o6 (2002) (noting that First
Amendment defenses have been rare in trade secret cases).
to. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. McLaughlin, No. CV 786804 2000, 2000 WL 48512 (Super.
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rights become stronger, conflicts with free speech interests become more
likely."
Part III considers the contention that the First Amendment should
have no role as a defense in trade secret cases, a view that the California
Supreme Court arguably endorsed in Bunner 111.2 This Part criticizes,
among other things, the court's reliance on a characterization of trade
secrets as property as a reason to reject First Amendment defenses in
trade secret cases.
Part IV concludes that preliminary injunctions against disclosure of
informational trade secrets should not be treated as prior restraints in
ordinary trade secret cases. However, third parties who obtain trade
secrets without participating in their misappropriation and who desire to
publicly disclose these secrets as newsworthy contributions to public
discourse should not be enjoined from such disclosures without satisfying
the rigorous First Amendment prior restraints doctrine.
Part V considers several other First Amendment due process issues,
such as whether the burden of proof in third party disclosure cases
should be higher than in normal trade secret cases and whether appellate
review of constitutionally relevant facts should be de novo when First
Amendment defenses have been raised.
I. WHY CONFLICTS BETWEEN TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT HAVE BEEN RARE THUS FAR
Courts rarely consider First Amendment implications when issuing
preliminary or permanent injunctions to prohibit the use or disclosure of
trade secrets because defendants rarely raise the First Amendment as a
defense to trade secret misappropriation claims. But why do they not
invoke the First Amendment? One reason is because the First
Amendment has no application in many trade secret cases. Another is
that limiting doctrines internal to trade secrecy law mediate most of the
tensions that are likely to arise when persons wish to disclose
informational trade secrets that might have First Amendment
implications.
Ct. 2000), rev'd sub nom. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Ct. App. 2oo0),
rev'd, 75 P.3d i (Cal. 2001), on remand to io Cal. Rptr. 3d 185 (Ct. App. 2004). For the sake of
simplicity, textual and footnote references to this case will be designated, with respect to the trial court
decision as Bunner I, the first Court of Appeal decision as Bunner II, the California Supreme Court
decision as Bunner III, and the Court of Appeal on remand as Bunner IV.
ii. Cf. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright in the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 2-7 (2000) (arguing that tensions between copyright and the First Amendment have increased
as the scope of copyright protection has increased).
12. See 75 P.3d 1, 13-18 (2001) (holding that the significant government interest in trade secrets
justifies a content-neutral injunction restraining First Amendment rights).
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A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT OFTEN HAS No APPLICATION IN TRADE
SECRET CASES
The First Amendment rarely has application in trade secret cases in
part because many trade secrets are "things" that do not implicate First
Amendment interests. 3 Firms may claim as trade secrets, for example,
the molds they use to cast their products, precision tools for refining
products within the factory, chemical processes, and the like. 4
Injunctions to stop use or disclosure of "thing" secrets generally do not
affect First Amendment free speech interests.
Additionally, most trade secret injunctions aim to regulate illegal or
unethical conduct.' 5 Misappropriators may be enjoined, for example,
from wiretapping a firm's phones to obtain trade secrets, soliciting
customers using misappropriated information, going through a
competitor's trash bins to obtain discarded documents, or using deceitful
means to access the secret. 6 Regulating illegal conduct also does not
implicate the First Amendment.
When courts decide whether to issue injunctions against use or
disclosure of informational trade secrets, they are, moreover, typically
faced with enforcing the agreements under which recipients of the secrets
obtained them or the confidential relationships under which the secrets
were disclosed to the defendants. Former employees, for example, may
be enjoined from disclosing customer lists and other secret information
to a new employer.'7 Caselaw suggests that injunctive relief to enforce
13. Flags and draft cards are, of course, "things," and conduct as to such things is sometimes
protected by the First Amendment, as when flags are burned in protest against government policies.
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (affirming reversal of conviction for flag
desecration in protest of government policies on First Amendment grounds). As Robert Post has
observed, the First Amendment may be implicated when the law regulates things that are integral
parts of a medium through which First Amendment values are expressed in social interactions. See,
e.g., Robert C. Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 713,
715-17 (2OOO). Use and disclosure of thing-trade secrets do not implicate First Amendment medium
interests.
14. The definition of trade secrets in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) emphasizes
"thing" secrets. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives one an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound,
a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device,
or a list of customers. Generally it relates to the production of goods, as, for example, a machine or
formula for the production of an article. Id.
15. Conduct such as flag burning can, of course, be First Amendment protected (e.g., when done
in protest of governmental policies). See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420. However, the kinds of conduct
typically regulated by trade secret injunctions (e.g., against use of a particular chemical in a production
process or forbidding bribery of a trade secret developer's employees or licensees) are not expressive
in a First Amendment sense.
I6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1993) (giving theft, fraud,
unauthorized interception of communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a breach of
confidence as examples of improper means to acquire a trade secret).
17. See, e.g., Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (enjoining former
1Vol. 58:777
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non-disclosure obligations arising from a contract or deriving from
confidential receipt of the information as against competitors is generally
consistent with the First Amendment.'
Insofar as trade secret injunctions aim to stop private use or
disclosure harmful to the plaintiff's economic interests, First Amendment
interests are less weighty because the secrets are matters of private
concern.' 9 The internal design of a software product, the polishing
processes a firm uses to refine ball-bearings, the secret ingredient that
distinguishes one firm's product from its competitors' products, training
manuals for salespeople, and detailed data about a firm's customers are
generally matters in which the public usually has little or no interest.
Disclosure of such private information to the public would rarely form
sound public policy, advance public discourse, or even be newsworthy."
First Amendment interests are more salient in trade secret cases
when the defendant's goal is to publicly disclose the secrets. Public
disclosure of trade secrets is rare, however, because misappropriators
generally have the same interest as the secret's developer in maintaining
secrecy as against the public and other industry participants.'
Misappropriators simply want to reuse the other firm's secrets in their
own commercial enterprises without paying appropriate license fees or
employee from disclosure of previous employer's trade secrets to new employer); Cybertek Computer
Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1977) (similarly enjoining
former employee).
i8. See infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text. Most such injunctions forbid private uses and
disclosures of the secret or confidential information in a manner that would breach the contract or
confidence. When defendants intend to make public disclosures of the secrets and the secrets are
newsworthy or otherwise of public concern, First Amendment considerations have greater weight.
19. Of course, the First Amendment can sometimes protect private disclosures as to matters of
private concerns. A city ordinance that forbade residents to gossip about private matters would surely
be unconstitutional under the First Amendment notwithstanding the fact that it concerned only
private disclosures of private matters. The inevitable disclosure doctrine of trade secret law may also
be incompatible with the First Amendment, particularly at a preliminary injunction stage. See Lemley
& Volokh, supra note 8, at 232. Such cases typically involve injunctions against private disclosures, not
public ones, as to matters of private concern. First Amendment concerns may, however, be adequately
accommodated in inevitable disclosure cases as long as courts use this doctrine sparingly (e.g., where
direct or circumstantial evidence indicates a high degree of likelihood of misappropriation and of
irreparable harm), successful plaintiffs are required to subsidize their former employees during the
period in which the injunction operates, and the duration of the injunction is short. See, e.g., PepsiCo,
Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (enjoining the defendant from working for the
competitor for one month); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 99 F. Supp. 624, 636 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(enjoining the defendant from working for the competitor for a period of up to six months). California
courts have rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine. See, e.g., Schlage Lock Co. v. Whyte, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 277, 281 (Ct. App. 2002).
20. The distinction between public and private concerns as it pertains to First Amendment trade
secret claims is discussed infra notes 6o-64 and accompanying text.
21. See Bunner IV, so Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 195 (Ct. App. 2004) (the typical defendant in a trade
secrecy case "has as much interest as the plaintiff has in keeping the secret away from good faith
competitors and out of the public domain").
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being subject to restrictions that might attend licensed use. Revealing
secrets to the public would not only thwart the misappropriator's intent
to free-ride on the secret; it would also facilitate detection of the
misappropriation and increase the likelihood that the trade secret
developer will be able to take effective action against the
misappropriator.22
B. THE LIMITING PRINCIPLES OF TRADE SECRET LAW GENERALLY OBVIATE
THE NEED FOR FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES
Conflicts between trade secret law and the First Amendment have
been rare because limiting doctrines of trade secrecy law mediate
tensions that might otherwise arise. It has become well-recognized that
limiting doctrines of copyright law, such as the idea/expression
distinction and the fair use defense,23 mediate tensions that might
otherwise arise between copyright interests and the First Amendment. 4
Less well-recognized, but equally true, is that the limiting principles of
trade secrecy law perform a similar function in mitigating potential
conflicts between trade secrets and the First Amendment.
i. Reverse Engineering
Consider, for example, Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg.2 Chicago Lock
alleged that the Fanbergs misappropriated its trade secret key codes
when they published a compilation of key code information and offered
22. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 8, at 1036 ("The usual case of industrial espionage is not followed
by widespread publication of the information so obtained. Rather, the thief usually wishes to keep its
theft private so as to avoid detection by the owner of the trade secret and to prevent the dissemination
of that trade secret to any other firms in the industry.").
23. See 17 U.S.C. § I02(b) (2ooo) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or is embodied in such
work."); id. § to7 (setting forth factors for determining fair use as a defense to infringement claims).
24. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-22 (2003) (holding that Copyright Term
Extension Act did not violate the First Amendment); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 559-60 (1985) (holding that the "fair use" defense is not strengthened or diminished by the
importance of the work). Some classic scholarly articles articulate the internal limits of copyright as
adequately accommodating First Amendment interests. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the
First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983 (i97o); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. Is8o (197o). These articles
championed a view, accepted in Eldred and Harper & Row, that the idea/expression distinction and
fair use accommodated tensions between copyright and the First Amendment. Many articles, however,
take a more expansive view of the First Amendment as a constraint on the scope of copyright. See,
e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (i999); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free
Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275 (2003); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8;
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millenium Copyright
Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 813 (2oos); Netanel, supra note i I; Volokh, supra note 8.
25. 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 198i).
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the compilation for sale. 6 The Fanbergs obtained much of the key code
information by reverse engineering Chicago locks for customers of their
locksmith business, and the rest from other locksmiths who performed
similar services. 7 Because the Fanbergs obtained the key code
information by reverse engineering, or from other reverse engineers, and
because trade secrecy law considers reverse engineering to be a fair
means of acquiring trade secrets, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled against Chicago Lock's trade secret claim and against enjoining
publication of the Fanberg book.2
8
The Ninth Circuit did not find it necessary to invoke the First
Amendment in support of this ruling, although an injunction against
publication of the Fanberg book would obviously be difficult to justify
under the First Amendment. 9 The Ninth Circuit did, however, express a
constitutional concern about Chicago Lock's claim, saying that if
California state trade secret law did not allow the Fanbergs to reverse-
engineer Chicago locks and did not allow disclosure of the results of
lawful reverse engineering, it "would, in effect, convert the Company's
trade secret into a state-conferred monopoly akin to the absolute
protection that a federal patent affords. Such an extension of [state]
trade secrets law would certainly be preempted by the federal scheme of
patent regulation,"3 invoking the Supreme Court's decision in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.3
2. Preemption as a Check on Trade Secret Law
Kewanee considered the compatibility of trade secrecy and patent
law.3" Kewanee sued Bicron for trade secret misappropriation after the
latter, founded by former Kewanee employees, began making large
crystals very much like Kewanee's and selling them in competition with
Kewanee.33 Bicron argued that Kewanee's trade secret claim was
preempted by federal patent law and policy.' 4 In essence, Bicron argued
that Kewanee should have gotten a patent for its crystal-making process
instead of claiming the process as a trade secret, and courts should not
reward Kewanee for failing to seek a patent.35 Trade secret law, in
Bicron's view, had created a significant obstacle to achieving important
26. Id. at 402-03.
27. Id. at 404.
28. Id. at 404-05.
29. See Post, supra note 13, at 718 (books are a medium of communication "unambiguously
covered by the First Amendment").
30. Chicago Lock Co., 676 F.2d at 405.
31. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
32. Id. at 473-74.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. For a more detailed account of Bicron's argument, see the Sixth Circuit's decision in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 470 (974).
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patent policy objectives such as promoting disclosure of significant
innovations and limiting the duration of legal protection available to
them.36 Kewanee's process was unpatented and, because Kewanee had
been using it for several years without seeking a patent, it had become
unpatentable.37 Yet, trade secrecy law provided Kewanee with protection
for a potentially infinite duration without any quid pro quo of disclosure
to justify the grant of legal protection. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals found Bicron's arguments persuasive;39 the Supreme Court did
not.
In concluding that trade secret law was compatible with patent law
and policy, the Court focused on weaknesses of trade secrecy law. Trade
secrets can easily be lost, not only by reverse engineering,4' but also
through accidental disclosure, independent creation by another, use of
other proper means to obtain the secret, and all too often by
misappropriation.' "Where patent law acts as a barrier," said the Court,
"trade secret law functions relatively as a sieve. The possibility that an
inventor who believes his invention meets the standards of patentability
will sit back, rely on trade secret law, and after one year of use forfeit any
right to patent protection is remote indeed."' But, as the Ninth Circuit
36. The Supreme Court had earlier ruled that state law is preempted when it creates an obstacle
to achieving objectives of patent law. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33
(1964) (liability for copying of lamp designs under state unfair competition preempted by federal
patent law because the designs were unpatented); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234, 238-39 (1964) (accord). Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented in Kewanee on the ground that
the decision "is at war with the philosophy" of Sears and Compco. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 495 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("[Elvery article not covered by a valid patent is in the public domain.").
37. Kewanee had used the process internally for several years, and was thus ineligible for a patent
on it under 35 U.S.C. § I02(b). Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 474.
38. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 496 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("By a patent, which would require full
disclosure, [Kewanee] could have obtained a 17 year monopoly against the world. By the District
Court's injunction, which the Court approves and reinstates, [it] gets a permanent injunction running
into perpetuity against respondents.").
39. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, io86 (6th Cir. 1973). The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court's findings of fact as to the misappropriation claim were not clearly
erroneous and "it was evident from the record that the individual Respondents appropriated to the
benefit of Bicron secret information on processes obtained while they were employees" of Kewanee's
predecessor in interest. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 474.
40. See, e.g., JAMES POOLEv, TRADE SECRETS § 5.02[I] (2oo6) (asserting that most trade secrets are
reverse engineered). The Court was even clearer about the constitutional significance of reverse
engineering in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., which struck down a Florida unfair
competition law that the Court construed as outlawing the most efficient means of reverse engineering
an unpatented product, namely using a plug-mold to make a competing boat hull. 489 U.S. 141, i6o
(1989). Reverse engineering, said the Court, is "an essential part of innovation," likely to yield insights
and variations on products that "may lead to significant advances in the field." Id. Moreover, "the
competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor" to develop further
patentable ideas. Id.
41. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489-90.
42. Id. at 490. Justice Marshall was not persuaded that this prospect was "remote indeed," but he
concurred in the judgment on the ground that patent and trade secret law had a long history of co-
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recognized in Chicago Lock, federal courts must exercise oversight when
state trade secrecy decisions try to "plug" the leakiness of this law, for
example, by making it more property-like, to ensure that state law does
not interfere with federal intellectual property law objectives.
3. Accidental Disclosure
The leakiness of trade secrecy law is not only important to its
compatibility with federal intellectual property law and policy, but also
with the First Amendment. In Religious Technology Center v. Lerma,43
for example, Religious Technology Center (RTC) sued the Washington
Post for trade secrecy misappropriation, alleging that the Post knew or
should have known that RTC claimed trade secret rights in certain
Scientology texts. ' RTC sought to preserve the trade secret status of the
information after litigation documents containing the secrets were filed
in court without a protective order.45 RTC sent its agents to the
courthouse to block access to the documents, but the Post was able to
obtain a copy of the documents from a court clerk.46 The court observed
that "[a]lthough the Post was on notice that the RTC had made certain
proprietary claims about these documents, there was nothing illegal or
unethical about the Post going to the clerk's office for a copy of the
documents.""
The court in Lerma did not need to invoke the First Amendment in
support of its ruling because an internal limiting principle (or
"weakness," to use Kewanee's terminology) of trade secrecy law
adequately protected the First Amendment interests of the Washington
Post, its reporters, and readers eager to know about Scientology
practices. Had the court concluded that the Post's knowledge of RTC's
proprietary claim sufficed to establish trade secret liability, the Post
could have invoked the First Amendment as a basis for defending against
RTC's trade secret claims. 8
existence, and Congress was well aware of this. Id. at 494.
43. 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995).
44. Id. at 1364-66.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1369. Documents containing the secrets had also been posted on the Internet for ten
days. Id. at 1368.
48. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 262 (E.D. Va. 1995) (Washington Post
successfully raised the First Amendment as a shield against issuance of temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction). Because the secrets in Lerma were embodied in a text, protecting this
information through trade secret law would not create an obstacle to fulfilling objectives of the patent
system, but preemption concerns might nevertheless arise. Copyright law, as pointed out supra note
23, does not protect the ideas and information in protected works and allows fair uses, such as
publishing excerpts in newspapers such as the Post. If a judge construed state trade secret law to
protect the information in RTC's work, notwithstanding its accidental disclosure, such a ruling would
arguably be preempted by copyright law and policy because it would protect information that
copyright law treats as public domain, once the work has been disclosed to the public.
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4. Limits on Third Party Liability
Another "weakness" in trade secret law that sometimes aids in
resolving tensions between trade secrecy law and the First Amendment
are its rules on secondary liability. Trade secret law differs from
copyright and patent law in that it requires a level of culpability for both
primary and secondary liability.49
Primary transgressors are those who acquired the secret by improper
means or who used or disclosed the secret in breach of a contract or a
confidence. ° Recipients of misappropriated secrets can be held
secondarily liable only if they knew or had reason to know that the
information they received from another was acquired by improper means
or was subject to non-disclosure requirements under a contract or
confidence." When third parties are held liable for misappropriation as
recipients of stolen trade secrets, it is generally in circumstances in which
the third parties have engaged in commercial exploitations of the secrets
in competition with the trade secret's developer." As a consequence,
First Amendment considerations do not arise when such secondary
liability is imposed.
Courts are generally careful not to be too hasty in imputing
knowledge of misappropriation to third party recipients of secrets. 3 In
Cabot Corp. v. Thai Tantalum, Inc.,' for example, the Delaware Court of
Chancery denied a motion for a preliminary injunction because the
plaintiff sought to impute knowledge of the misappropriated secret to a
third party recipient based upon the latter's knowledge of a lawsuit that
49. In the U.S. direct (or primary) patent and copyright infringement are strict liability offenses.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (20oo). That is, anyone who violates one of the exclusive
rights granted to innovators is an infringer (e.g., making a copy of a copyrighted work or using a
patented invention) without regard to the actor's fault. Patent and copyright law require some
culpability, however, to establish indirect (or secondary) liability. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c)
(providing that active inducement is required for liability; no contributory infringement exists unless
actor is making a technology that he knows was specially adapted for infringement); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (explaining that contributory infringement
requires showing knowledge that one is contributing to infringement; vicarious liability requires
showing a failure to supervise and control an infringer; inducement liability requires affirmative acts of
inducement and a specific intent to induce infringement).
50. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § I(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619 (2005);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 40,43 (1993).
51. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § i(b) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619 (2005);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1993).
52. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1993) ("The unauthorized
disclosure of a trade secret ordinarily occurs as part of an attempt to exploit the commercial value of
the secret through use in competition with the trade secret owner or through a sale of the information
to other potential users.").
53. Yet, courts do impose liability if the recipient had reason to know that he received
misappropriated information. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1993).
54. No. 12580, 1992 WL 172678 (Del. Ch. July 22, 1992).
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the plaintiff had initiated against the direct misappropriator 5
Merely knowing that information is claimed as a trade secret does
not, moreover, give rise to liability if the information leaked out through
no fault of the recipient. In Lerma, for example, RTC sought to hold the
Post secondarily liable for trade secret misappropriation because the
Post knew or ought to have known that information from its Scientology
texts that an unnamed party had posted on the Internet for ten days were
misappropriated secrets. 6 The Post's knowledge of RTC's claim of trade
secrecy was irrelevant, however, because the information had been
posted on the Internet and had become "effectively part of the public
domain, impossible to retrieve."57 Once again, the limiting principles of
trade secrecy law helped to protect the Post's interests in publication
without any need to invoke the First Amendment.
Most of the trade secret cases in which First Amendment defenses
have succeeded have involved journalists or news organizations who
received and then published, or were about to publish, information
obtained from persons whom the recipients arguably had reason to know
might have misappropriated the secrets."' This is where First
Amendment defenses have the greatest salience as a safeguard against
expansive trade secret claims.59
5. Trade Secret Interests May Be Overridden by Other Societal
Interests
Yet another limiting principle of trade secrecy law that minimizes
the potential for conflict between this law and the First Amendment is
the well-recognized privilege to disclose trade secrets "in connection
with ... information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the
55. Id. at *i-*2. Trade secrecy law also enables an innocent recipient of trade secrets who made
substantial investments in reliance on its right to use the information, subject to an obligation to pay
royalties for use of misappropriated secrets. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 45 cmt. g (1993).
56. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 9o8 F. Supp. 1362, 1368-69 (E.D. Va. 1995).
57. Id. at 1368. Someone who posts a trade secret on the Internet "may be liable for trade secret
misappropriation, [but] the party who merely downloads Internet information cannot be liable for
misappropriation because there is no misconduct involved in interacting with the Internet." Id.; accord
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., gol F. Supp. 1519, 1526 (D. Colo. 1995) (rejecting similar
trade secret misappropriation claims against a website critical of the Church of Scientology because
information from these texts had already been "made available on the Internet through persons other
than Lerma, with the potential for downloading by countless users"); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-line Commc'n. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Although Ehrlich cannot
rely on his own improper postings to support the argument that the Church's documents are no longer
secrets.., evidence that another individual has put the alleged trade secrets in the public domain
prevents RTC from further enforcing its trade secret rights in those materials.").
58. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304 (Or. 1996); infra
note 249 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 8, at 741 (arguing that trade secret injunctions, as applied to third
parties, should be subject to strict scrutiny).
HASTINGS LA WJOURNAL
commission of a crime or tort, or other matters of substantial concern."'
If, for example, a firm considers certain chemicals used in its
manufacturing process to be trade secrets, but those chemicals are toxins
whose use violates environmental protection laws, the public policy of
environmental safety is likely to override the firm's interests in
protecting this information as a trade secret.6
Public policy also appropriately limits the enforceability of
agreements between a firm and its employees that forbid disclosure of
non-public information about the firm when government agents initiate
legitimate inquiries into the firm's business. ' Some state and federal
"whistleblowing" statutes privilege disclosures that might otherwise be
regarded as trade secret misappropriations.' The Restatement of Unfair
Competition also recognizes that a firm cannot enforce a contract that
information should be treated as a trade secret when it is not, in fact, a
secret. 64
II. WHY CONFLICTS BETWEEN TRADE SECRETS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT MAY BECOME MORE COMMON
Conflicts between trade secrets and the First Amendment may
become more common because of the increased importance of
intellectual property in the U.S. economy in recent decades and the
concomitant trend towards strengthening IP rights. As trade secret rights
in information get stronger, tensions between trade secret law and the
First Amendment are likely to increase. Furthermore, firms are now
using mass market license agreements to keep information secret that
would be discoverable and potentially disclosable under traditional
principles of trade secrecy and IP laws. In addition, some commentators
have argued that trade secret law must be strengthened to give greater
legal protection to trade secrets because of their vulnerability to
misappropriation via the Internet.
6o. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (993) ("[D]isclosure of another's
trade secret for purposes other than commercial exploitation may implicate the interest in freedom of
expression or advance another significant public interest .... The existence of a privilege to disclose
another's trade secret depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the nature of
the information, the purpose of the disclosure, and the means by which the actor acquired the
information.").
61. A newspaper intending to publish this information would surely raise the First Amendment to
any charge of misappropriation raised by the firm wanting to protect its secrets, and would likely win.
62. See, e.g., Alan Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 264-66 (1998) (giving examples).
63. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (West 1996 & Supp. 2006); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (West 2002
& Supp. 2006).
64. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRo) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (993). This too is part of the
weakness of trade secret law that mitigates tensions that would otherwise arise between trade secret
law and the First Amendment.
[Vol. 58:777
March 2007] TRADE SECRETS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. THE RISING IMPORTANCE AND STRENGTHENING OF TRADE SECRETS
As the U.S. economy has become increasingly information-based,
the role of intellectual property laws has become important in promoting
economic growth and in inducing firms to invest in the development of
innovative products and services.6' Firms are now more aware of the
benefits of protecting intangible assets and now claim a broader range of
non-public information as trade secrets than in the past.66
Perhaps in part because of the rising importance of intellectual
property laws, trade secrecy law has gotten somewhat stronger over time.
When Kewanee was decided, trade secret law was considered a relatively
weak form of protection against certain forms of unfair competition,
and courts were skeptical of the notion that trade secret developers have
"property" rights in their secrets. Today, trade secrecy law is widely
perceived as a strong form of legal protection,68 and courts and
commentators more commonly refer to trade secrets as "property." 69 The
trend toward more expansive intellectual property protection may also
indirectly encourage trade secret developers, among others, to make
bolder claims than in past decades.7" Together, these developments
contribute to an enhanced potential for conflicts between trade secrecy
and free speech interests.
B. USE OF MASS MARKET LICENSES TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTION OF
TRADE SECRETS
In the past twenty years it has become increasingly common for
firms to try to strengthen trade secrecy protection through mass market
license terms that, if enforced, would plug some of the leaks that trade
secrecy law would ordinarily allow.7' The use of mass market licenses to
65. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy's Approach to Information Products:
Muscling Copyright and Patent Into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SuP. CT. REV. 195,
197 (1993); J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of
Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 66o (1989).
66. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
i9oo-2ooo, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2233-40 (2000) (discussing expansions in intellectual property
protection during the twentieth century). See generally EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECrUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR A KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
67. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998).
69. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (holding trade secrets to be
property for purposes of takings law); see also infra notes 169-92 and accompanying text (considering
the property conception of trade secret law).
70. See, e.g., Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(plaintiff arguing for an "equitable trade secret theory," even though secret had been subsequently
published); DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT & T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 331-33 (4th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff
arguing that mere possession, rather than ownership, is sufficient to bring a trade secret
misappropriation claim).
71. For an excellent discussion of the innovation and competition policy concerns arising from the
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forbid reverse engineering has become common in the software
industry.72 Although the effort to deter reverse engineering through mass
market licenses is mainly of concern because of its impact on ongoing
innovation and competition,73 it can also have free speech implications as
well, for it can facilitate what some scholars have characterized as the
"privication" of information that would otherwise be public. 74 Four
examples illustrate this potential.
i. EDELMAN v. N2H2
Benjamin Edelman is a technologist who wanted to reverse engineer
a filtering program made by N2H2 that has been used widely in public
schools, libraries, and similar institutions to protect minors from
exposure to indecent or otherwise harmful material posted on the
Internet.75 Edelman is skeptical about N2H2's claims of efficacy for this
program.76 The only effective way for him to find out what sites the
program blocks is to reverse engineer the software.77 Edelman believes
this information is critically important to an ongoing public policy debate
over whether legislatures should mandate use of filtering software in
public schools and libraries.7
However, N2H2 regards the list of sites that its software blocks as a
trade secret and only makes its program available under a mass-market
license that forbids reverse engineering.' N2H2 also uses encryption to
protect the block-list embedded in this program and claims that reverse
engineering the encryption to analyze the block-list would violate the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) anti-circumvention rules.s°
Edelman sought a declaratory judgment that his intended reverse
use of mass market licenses to plug the leakiness of trade secrecy law, see generally Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade Secret? How Article 2B Will Make Licensing of Trade Secrets
Easier (But Innovation More Difficult), 87 CAL. L. REV. 191 (1999).
72. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and Online Licenses, 22 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 511, 520 n.28 (i997); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. I 11, 129 (1999).
73. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, I I I YALE L.J. i575, 1582-94 (20O2).
74. See Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and
Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2OOO).
75. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13-15, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc., 263 F.
Supp. 2d 137 (D. Mass. 2003) (No. o2-CV-I1503-RGS), available at http://www.aclu.org/
FilesPDFs/edelman.pdf.
76. Id. at so-I 5 .
77. Id. at 37.
78. Edelman was an expert witness in American Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d
401, 442-44 (E.D. Pa. 2002). He studied over- and under-blocking by testing filtering programs against
various individual sites. Id. However, this technique provided incomplete analysis of the efficacy of
filtering programs. Id.
79. See Complaint, supra note 75, at 24.
8o. See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, In Legal First, ACLU Sues Over New
Copyright Law (July 25, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/speech/1481 iprs2002o725.html.
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engineering activity was lawful, but the court dismissed the lawsuit,8 '
leaving him no choice but to risk substantial liability or give up the effort
to test the efficacy of the software."' This effectively privicated that
information.
2. Microsoft and the Kerberos Specification
Microsoft utilized a similar mix of technology and mass-market
licensing to try to maintain the trade secrecy status for a specification of a
security system known as Kerberos. 3 Microsoft posted the specification
on a website, but required those who wanted access to the specification
to enter into a licensing agreement purporting to impose a non-disclosure
requirement on licensees. When a clever technologist figured out a way
to get access to the specification without clicking "I agree" to the license,
Microsoft asserted that the act of bypassing the license and disseminating
information about how to bypass the license violated the DMCA anti-
circumvention rules." Although Microsoft did not pursue litigation
against this circumvention after public outcry over this strategy, it was
clearly intending to privicate this information.
3. PEOPLE v. NETWORK ASSOCIATES
Network Associates included a term in its mass market license
forbidding disclosure of benchmarking data (i.e., information about how
well the program performed when tested by a customer's engineers) or
publication of reviews of its software without the firm's permission.
Cognizant of the implication of this licensing strategem for free speech
and competition policy, the New York Attorney General's office
successfully brought suit against Network Associates to compel the firm
to drop these provisions from its mass market licenses."' The public had a
8i. Edelman v. N212, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 137, 138 (D. Mass. 2003). Because Edelman had not
entered into a licensing agreement with N2H2, the court agreed with N2H2 that he was seeking an
advisory opinion. Id. at 138-39.
82. Edelman abandoned this project after his case was dismissed because he feared risks of
litigation. E-mail from Ben Edelman to author (July 28, 2006, 14:45:55 AST) (on file with author). A
similar lawsuit, albeit one brought by a rightholder against reverse engineers, is discussed in Declan
McCullagh, Mattel's Filtering Fiasco to Court, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 27, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/news/business/o,1367,35i96,oo.html. Mattel, owner of rights in the Cyber Patrol
filtering software, sued two cryptanalysts who reverse engineered Cyber Patrol in breach of a mass
market license forbidding reverse engineering and then developed "cphack.exe," software that
enabled users to bypass the filter. Id. The defendants settled this lawsuit by transferring their
copyrights in the software to Mattel, which sought to revoke the open source license under which the
software had been distributed so it could sue for infringement any sites that had posted "cphack.exe."
See The Story of CPHack, http://cphack.robinlionheart.com (last visited Mar. t, 2007).
83. See Julie E. Cohen, Call It the Digital Millennium Censorship Act: Unfair Use, NEw REPUBLIC
ONLINE, May 23, 2000, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/jec/unfairuse.html.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. People v. Network Assoc., Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 466,467-68 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
87. Id. at 470-71. The New York Attorney General's Internet Bureau persuaded the court to
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legitimate interest in thwarting this attempted privication of information
through a mass market license. Yet, other firms continue to use similar
license terms.88
4. DVD CCA v. BUNNER
DVD Copy Control Association (DVD CCA) is a non-profit entity
created by major motion picture studios to hold and license certain
intellectual property rights in DVD-related technologies.89 As a condition
of licensing these rights, DVD CCA required licensed makers of DVD
players to install an encryption program known as the Content Scramble
System (CSS) in their players to protect DVD movies from unauthorized
copying, to undertake various security measures to ensure that CSS
remained secret, and to include in licenses with their customers
provisions forbidding reverse engineering of CSS.9 DVD CCA believed
that the web of licensing obligations it created through these agreements
gave it rights to CSS as a trade secret that were, in effect, good against
the world.9'
In the summer of 1999, it became known that someone had reverse
engineered CSS, and that person or another had written a program
known as DeCSS that was capable of decrypting CSS.92 Andrew Bunner
was one of hundreds of people who learned about DeCSS from
discussions about it on Slashdot and other websites and who decided to
post the program on their webpages in late October I999.9'
Approximately two months later, DVD CCA sued Andrew Bunner,
twenty other named individuals, and five hundred John Does for trade
secret misappropriation, alleging that Bunner and his co-defendants
knew or should have known that a computer program known as DeCSS,
which they had posted on their websites, contained or was derived from
enjoin Network Associates from selling software under conditions that prohibited consumers from
disclosing the results of benchmark tests or from publishing reviews of Network Associates's products
without permission. Id. at 471.
88. See, e.g., AttachmateWRQ Software License Agreement, http://mx.attachmate.com/NR/
rdonlyres/DF244244-583F-4B84-BF3o-9o9i2BI28245/o/SLAeng.pdf (last .visited Mar. i, 2007). For
further discussion of policy implications of such clauses, see, for example, Genelle I. Belnas & Brian
N. Larson, Clicking Away Your Free Speech Rights. The Enforceability of Gagwrap Licenses, 12 COMM.
L. & POL'Y 37 (2007).
89. Bunner 111, 75 P.3d i, 6-7 (Cal. 2003).
9o. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 7-8. The DVD CCA claimed that a Norwegian teenager named Jon Johansen was the
reverse engineer who breached such a license. See Bunner I, No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512 at *2
(Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 21, 2000). Johansen was not, however, the person who reverse engineered CSS.
See Sunde v. Johansen, No 02-507 M/94 (Oslo Court of First Instance Jan. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/Johansen-DeCSScase/2003oio9_johansen-english-decision.rtf (noting
that Johansen obtained the reverse engineered information from a person using the moniker
"nomad").
93. Bunner IV, to Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 189-9 (Ct. App. 2004).
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trade secrets that had been stolen from DVD CCA when someone
reverse-engineered CSS in breach of an anti-reverse engineering clause
of a DVD player license.94 Bunner claimed a First Amendment right to
post this information on the Internet, as well as denying that he was a
misappropriator of trade secrets.95
In granting DVD CCA's motion for a preliminary injunction, the
trial judge found that CSS had likely been reverse engineered in
violation of a click-through agreement, that DeCSS embodied or was
substantially derived from stolen trade secrets, and that Bunner and his
co-defendants were liable as co-misappropriators of CSS secrets because
they knew or ought to have known DeCSS contained stolen secrets, as
witnessed by "various defendants' inclination to boast about their
disrespect for the law." 6 The judge also took into account the
"considerable time, effort and money [that had been spent] in creating
the intellectual property at issue in order to protect the copyrighted
information contained on DVDs."'  He issued a preliminary injunction
forbidding Bunner and his co-defendants from posting or otherwise
94. Complaint for Injunctive Relief for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets at 9! 34-39, DVD
Copy Control Ass'n v. McLaughlin, No. CV 786804 (Super. Ct. Cal. Dec. 28, 1999), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/DVDCCA-case/i9991228-complaint.html. DVD CCA also sued for trade
secret misappropriation a firm that sold T-shirts on which the text of DeCSS was printed. See Sara
Crasson, Are DeCSS T-Shirts Dirty Laundry? Wearable, Non-Executable Computer Code as Protected
Speech, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 169, 169 (2004). At about the same time as DVD
CCA commenced the Bunner case, Universal City Studios and other motion picture studios brought
suit against a journalist named Eric Corley, alleging that posting and linking to DeCSS violated the
anti-circumvention rules of the DMCA. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436
(2d Cir. 2OOl). Corley's principal defense was that he had a First Amendment right to publish DeCSS.
Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a permanent injunction forbidding Corley to post or
link to source or object code forms of DeCSS. Id. at 458-60. After this decision was rendered, lawyers
for the motion picture industry sent a cease and desist letter to Dr. David Touretsky, a computer
science researcher at Carnegie Mellon University, demanding that he take down his Gallery of CSS
Descramblers, which featured many different expressions of how to descramble DVD CCA's
encryption program. David S. Touretzky, Gallery of CSS Descramblers,
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/DeCSS/Gallery (last visited Mar. I, 2007). Dr. Touretsky declined to do
so. Id.
95. See Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Order to Show
Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction, DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. McLaughlin, No. CV 786804
(Super. Ct. Cal., Jan. 7, 2000), http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/DVDCCA-case/zooooro7-pi-motion-
response.html.
96. Bunner I, No. CV 786804, 2o00 WL 48512, at *2 (Super. Ct. Cal. 2o0o).
97. Id. at *3. The judge did not seem to grasp the novelty of DVD CCA's theory that information
about CSS should be protected as trade secrets in order to protect non-trade secret interests of non-
parties to the lawsuit, that is, the interests of the motion picture industry in protecting copyrighted
movies from unauthorized copying. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Reverse Engineering Under Siege,
COMM. ACM, Oct. 2002, at 15 17-19; Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Defendant at 12-17, 75 P.3d I (Cal. 2o03), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/cenpro/samuelson/projectspapers/2002sp-dvd-bunner-_brief.pdf
(explaining weaknesses of this aspect of DVD CCA's trade secrecy theory).
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disclosing DeCSS or CSS secrets.9
Four years later, DVD CCA's trade secret claim was found to be too
weak to support the grant of a preliminary injunction. 9 Because DeCSS
had been available on hundreds of websites for about two months before
DVD CCA commenced the lawsuit and three months before the
preliminary injunction issued, the appellate court ruled that it was
unlikely that DVD CCA could succeed in showing that any CSS-derived
information embodied in DeCSS was protectable as a trade secret."
Left for another day was the question whether DVD CCA should be
able to use mass market licenses to override the reverse engineering
privilege of trade secrecy law and to bind the whole world not to reverse
engineer globally distributed DVD players it did not manufacture
through multiple layers of license requirements reaching down to the
end-user.'
Had the courts in Bunner been attentive to federal preemption
considerations, they might have observed that upholding DVD CCA's
claim "would, in effect, convert the [plaintiff's] trade secret into a state-
conferred monopoly akin to the absolute protection that a federal patent
affords .... . As the Ninth Circuit said in Chicago Lock, "Such an
extension of California trade secrets law would certainly be preempted
by the federal scheme of patent regulation."" Such an extension of
California trade secret law would also increase tensions between trade
secret law and the First Amendment, for a reverse engineer of a program
such as CSS might want to publish what he learned in a scientific paper.'"
The problem posed by anti-reverse engineering and anti-disclosure
terms of mass market licenses is relatively new. For many years, mass
98. Bunnerl, 2000 WL 4 85 12, at *I.
99. Bunner IV, io Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 187 (Ct. App. 2004). The First Amendment issues raised in
Bunner IV are discussed infra notes 334-46 and accompanying text.
ioo. Bunner IV, to Cal. Rptr. 3d at 189-9o.
IoI. Only Justice Moreno, in his concurrence in Bunner III, recognized the novelty of this aspect
of DVD CCA's claim:
[N]owhere has it been recognized that a party wishing to protect proprietary information
may employ a consumer form contract to, in effect, change the statutory definition of
"improper means" under trade secret law to include reverse engineering so that an alleged
trade secret holder may bring an action even against a nonparty to that contract.
Bunner III, 75 P.3d i, 28 n.5 (Cal. 2003) (Moreno, J., concurring). The Court of Appeal found a
different flaw in DVD CCA's claim. Bunner II, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 342 (Ct. App. 2002). Apparently
Xing, one of DVD CCA's licensees, neglected to abide by its contractual obligations to DVD CCA
and failed to install CSS securely or omitted end-user licenses in its products. Id. at 344. Some
commentators have argued that evidence of misappropriation of the CSS secrets was also weak. See
Alex Eaton-Salners, DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner: Freedom of Speech and Trade Secrets,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 269, 279-80 (2004).
1O2. Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982).
103. Id.
Io4- See Bunner IV, to Cal. Rptr. 3d at 189 ("CSS was widely analyzed and discussed in the
academic cryptography community."); id. at t9o (discussing news coverage about DeCSS).
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market licenses were considered unenforceable as contracts of adhesion
or as, at best, proposals for modifications to the contract that users did
not accept by acts such as opening the package or installing the
software."s The enforceability of mass market license restrictions on
reverse engineering, in particular, has been much debated and not
definitively resolved.6 Software and other information technology
developers have supported initiatives to validate these licenses, such as
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), now in
force in Virginia and Maryland." UCITA declares that mass market
licenses are valid and enforceable so long as users of computer
information have manifested assent to the terms by such acts as using the
product after notice that it is subject to a license.' The Federal Trade
Commission and a group of state Attorneys General, among others,
opposed UCITA out of concern about its impacts on consumers."
105. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239,
1239-48 (995) (discussing the caselaw).
lo6. An anti-reverse engineering clause of a software license was enforced in Bowers v. Bay State
Techs., Inc., but Bay State had also infringed Bowers's copyright, which may have colored the court's
judgment on the lawfulness of its reverse engineering. 320 F.3d 1332, 1341-44 (Fed. Cir. 2003). One
federal appellate court has ruled that anti-reverse engineering clauses in mass-market software
licenses should not be enforceable because they conflict with federal intellectual property policy. See
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988). Bunner has a particularly strong
claim for not being bound by a DVD CCA required license given how remote he was from the reverse
engineering activities and any license that may have been breached, as well as how remote DVD CCA
was from the reverse engineer. Commentary on the enforceability of anti-reverse engineering clauses
of mass market licenses has mostly been critical of the idea. See, e.g., Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra
note 73, at 1626-3o (recommending against enforcement of such license terms in software contracts
and citing commentators who have considered the issue).
io7. UCITA was once expected to become Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Concerns about the relationship between proposed Article 2B and intellectual property law were
discussed at a conference organized by the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology at Boalt Hall in
April 1998 on "Intellectual Property and Contract Law for the Information Age." See generally
Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law for the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B
of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce, 87 CAL. L. REV. I
(I999); Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law for the Information Age: The Impact of
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 8o9 (I998). Shortly after that conference, the American Law Institute withdrew as a
cosponsor of Article 2B. See SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON SECURITY INTERESTs, SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW, ABA, ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000 (20oo). The National Conference on Commissioners
of Uniform State Laws later promulgated it as UCITA. Although adopted in Maryland and Virginia,
UCITA has not met with favor in other states. Lauria J. Flynn, The Battle Lines Are Drawn in the
Struggle for a Uniform Standard in Software Licensing for all 50 States, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at
C3. Yet, mass market licenses are often enforced. Indeed, recent caselaw has even enforced terms of
service as contractual obligations notwithstanding an absence of proof of assent; merely using a
website has been held to create a contract under the website developer's terms of use. See generally
Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use (Mar. 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
io8. UCITA § 209 (1999).
to9. See, e.g., Letter from Joan Z. Bernstein et al. of the Federal Trade Commission, to John
McClaughtery of the National Conference on Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (July 9, 1999),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v99ooio.htm.
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Although the initiative to promote UCITA has faltered, a new
project on software licensing rules is underway. Based on preliminary
drafts, it seems likely to validate mass market licenses, although it may
be more balanced in regards to consumer interests."' In the interim,
though, serious doubts raised about the enforceability of privication
provisions in such licenses may be deterring some firms from being too
aggressive in their use."' This may change if courts show more receptivity
to these terms. Greater enforceability of state rules that "plug" the
leakiness of trade secret law will enhance the potential for tensions
between trade secrets and the First Amendment, as well as with trade
secrets and federal intellectual property law.
C. THE INTERNET AS A THREAT TO TRADE SECRETS
The vulnerability of trade secrets to dissipation by postings on the
Internet has been much discussed."' Commentators agree that tensions
between trade secrecy law and the First Amendment increase when
defendants raise free speech defenses to misappropriation claims
involving Internet postings, although they differ about how courts should
respond."3 Those skeptical of First Amendment defenses point out that
virtually anyone can become a publisher of information on the Internet,
that information published on the Internet has a potentially global
audience of millions of people, that anonymous postings may make it
difficult to track down misappropriators, and that it may be difficult to
quantify losses to trade secret developers or the misappropriators may be
I to. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT No. 2 (2005).
III. See Karjala, supra note 72, at 520 n.28; Lemley, supra note 72, at 129.
112. See, e.g., Atkins, supra note 8, at 1196 ("Trade secret law is in danger of extinction on the
Internet."); Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 8, at 29-30 (discussing risks of the Internet for trade
secrets); Sahara Murthy, Comment, Public Concern-A Newsworthy Exception to the Grant of
Preliminary Injunctions in Trade Secrecy Cases, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 219, 220 (2006) ("[T]he
Internet has multiplied the risk of loss of a trade secret").
113. The First Amendment advocate who gives most weight to First Amendment interests and
least to trade secret interests when they conflict is Greene, supra note 8, whose four-part test for
resolving conflicts between trade secret law and the First Amendment is discussed infra notes 391-92
and accompanying text. Volokh argues for strict scrutiny when preliminary injunctions are under
consideration as to third party recipients who want to publish them. See Volokh, supra note 8, at 739-
48. Murthy proposes an exception to trade secrecy law for publication of newsworthy information of
public concern. Murthy, supra note 112, at 238-42. At the opposite end of the spectrum are
Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 8, at 57-66, who believes the First Amendment has no role to play in
trade secret cases, id. at 62-63, and Atkins, supra note 8, at 1187-96, who would impose duties on third
party recipients of misappropriated information to investigate its provenance before publishing
information, in effect, creating a new right of privacy for trade secrets. Johnson offers a balancing test
for mediating between trade secret and First Amendment interests; it would weigh the nature of the
information (e.g., how technical it is; how much investment was required to develop it), the way in
which the defendant obtained it, and the comparative harm to the intended publisher and the trade
secret developer, such that the greater the harm to the trade secret developer, the less likely a First
Amendment defense would be to succeed. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 540.
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judgment-proof. "With the Internet, significant leverage is gained by the
gadfly, who has no editor looking over his shoulder and no professional
ethics to constrain him."...4 Because Internet disclosure of trade secrets
may undermine incentives to invest in innovation and cause harm to
industry and society, some commentators have proposed strengthening
trade secret rights to respond to the grave dangers that the Internet poses
for secrets."5
Trade secret rights can be strengthened in a number of ways: (i)
enforcement of mass market license terms forbidding reverse
engineering and disclosure of non-public information about the product,
(2) stretching the concept of what is a protectable secret, (3) lowering the
level of proof necessary to show that a secondary recipient of the secret
should have known the information was a misappropriated secret when
receiving it, (4) construing rights in trade secrets as "property" rights,
and (5) declaring that trade secret claims are categorically immune from
First Amendment challenges.
Bunner I illustrates the willingness to extend trade secret law in
order to protect trade secrets against misappropriation on the Internet.
Judge Elfving was concerned that unless he enjoined Bunner and others
from posting of DeCSS, it would "encourage misappropriaters [sic] of
trade secrets to post the fruits of their wrongdoing on the Internet as
quickly as possible and as widely as possible thereby destroying a trade
secret forever. Such a holding would not be prudent in this age of the
Internet. '" 6 His view of Bunner and his co-defendants as intellectual
property anarchists'' contributed to his willingness to stretch trade secret
law in four ways: (I) by treating the anti-reverse engineering clause of
DVD CCA's mass market license as enforceable as against Johansen and
by extension, Bunner and his co-defendants, ' 18 (2) by construing CSS
secrets as not having been dissipated notwithstanding considerable
Internet-based discussion about DeCSS and almost three months of
postings on hundreds of sites,"9 (3) by concluding that Bunner and others
must have known that DeCSS embodied DVD CCA's trade secrets
114. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
115. See Atkins, supra note 8, at 187-96; Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 8, at 57-65; Johnson,
supra note 8, at 54o-41; Goldberg, supra note 8, at 292-93; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F-3d 429, 454 (2d Cir. 2001) (listing dangers of Internet as reason for lesser First
Amendment protection for posting information on the Internet).
i6. Bunner I, No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512, at *3 (Super. Ct. Cal. 2000).
117. See id. at *2-*3. Without an injunction against posting DeCSS, the motion picture industry's
efforts to protect DVDs from unauthorized copying would "become completely meaningless." Id. The
court not only perceived Bunner et al. to be trade secret anarchists, but also intellectual property
anarchists, as the main threat posed by DeCSS was to copyrighted DVD movies.
i 18. See id. at *2.
it9. Seeid. at*3.
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based on some bombastic statements by a few of them,'2° and (4) by
neglecting to mention that Bunner had raised a First Amendment
defense to DVD CCA's claims,"' which is tantamount to saying that the
First Amendment has no role in trade secret cases.
Posting information on the Internet does not, however,
automatically cause it to cease to be a protectable trade secret. If trade
secret information is posted on an obscure site on the Internet and the
misappropriation is quickly detected, a trade secret developer will
generally be able to obtain a court order to take the information down
from the Internet site and forbid its reposting."2 This is consistent with
trade secret cases in which, for example, lawyers initially failed to seek a
court order to seal documents containing trade secrets as part of court
filings, but realized this promptly and sought a protective order.'23 Even if
a document is publicly accessible on the Internet for some period of time,
it will not lose its trade secret status if very few persons have actually
seen the information.' 4
Of course, the longer information is available on the Internet, the
more sites at which it is available, the larger the number of people who
have accessed the information, the farther word has spread about the
availability of the information (e.g., through newsgroups or in
chatrooms), the greater the likelihood that its trade secret status will be
lost.' This is unfortunate, but it is a risk inherent to trade secrecy law
that information may leak out, particularly if it is susceptible to reverse
engineering.
There have been fewer instances of trade secret misappropriation
via the Internet than some commentators have predicted.2 As noted
120. See id. at *2.
121. See id. at *3-4.
122. See Bunner IV, so Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Publication on the Internet
does not necessarily destroy the secret if the publication is sufficiently obscure or transient or
otherwise limited so that it does not become generally known to the relevant people, i.e., potential
competitors or other persons to whom the information would have some economic value."); id. at 253-
54 (injunction appropriate if information on Internet has not become publicly known).
123. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 849 (ioth Cir. i993)
(inadvertent and inconsequential disclosures of trade secret at trial and short delay in sealing court
records did not cause loss of trade secret status).
124. See, e.g., Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and the Internet: A Practical Perspective, 14
COMPUTER LAW. 6 (997) (offering suggestions for how trade secret owners can protect trade secrets to
protect against Internet dissipation); see also Elizabeth Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the
Internet Through Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2007) (setting
forth a test for preserving trade secrets that have been posted on the Internet).
125. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 9o8 F. Supp. 1362, 1368-69 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(information available in unsealed court records for two years and on the Internet for ten days);
Bunner IV, io Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 248 (Ct. App. 2004) (information displayed on or linked to at least
118 websites for more than three months before the lawsuit was filed).
126. See Karjala, supra note 72; Lemley, supra note 72. Besides the Bunner and RTC cases, the
caselaw on the Internet posting of trade secrets is very sparse. See Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp.
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earlier, misappropriators of trade secrets typically do not publish the
secrets to the world because they want to exploit the secret for their own
commercial purposes. Firms can, in fact, take a number of steps to
protect trade secrets from Internet misappropriation.'27 A significant
deterrent to publication of trade secrets on the Internet is the high
probability of detection of the misappropriation, and the consequent risk
of substantial financial liability for misappropriation and/or criminal
prosecution under state laws or the federal Economic Espionage Act.
The latter seems to have been adequate thus far to deter trade secret
anarchists or vengeful persons from posting valuable trade secrets on the
Internet.
The Internet certainly poses risks for trade secret developers-as
indeed it poses for many other important societal interests (e.g.,
protecting children from pornography, protecting privacy and copyrights,
preventing spam, spyware, and fraudulent solicitations) -but these risks
are not so grave that courts should distort trade secret law or the First
Amendment to make the rules stricter in cyberspace than in other
realms. Courts in other cases, notably Reno v. ACLU,' 9 have rejected
arguments for lesser First Amendment protection for speech on the
Internet.
III. TRADE SECRET CLAIMS AND REMEDIES ARE NOT CATEGORICALLY
IMMUNE FROM FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
Those who argue that trade secret claims are categorically immune
from the First Amendment rely heavily on the characterization of trade
2d 745, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (denying preliminary injunction against third party posting of trade
secrets about car designs on First Amendment grounds); O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d
72, 76-77 (Ct. App. 2oo6) (issuing protective order against subpoena seeking information about the
sources of leaked trade secrets). This contrasts sharply with the prevalence of copyright infringement
on the Internet. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3 d 1004, 1oI9 (9 th Cir. 2001)
(discussing millions of users of Napster's peer-to-peer file sharing technology to swap digital music
files).
127. See, e.g., Cundiff, supra note 124; David G. Majdali, Note, Trade Secrets Versus the Internet:
Can Trade Secret Protection Survive the Internet?, 22 WHrrnER L. REv. I25, 145-55 (2OOO); Ryan
Lambrecht, Note, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for Disclosure in the
Information Age?, 18 REv. LITIG. 317,339-40 (1999).
128. See i8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (West 2006); see also Lambrecht, supra note 127, at 361-62
(discussing criminal sanctions for trade secret misappropriation). There have been some criminal
actions brought against Internet misappropriators. See United States v. Genovese, 409 F. Supp. 2d 253,
254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (posting Microsoft proprietary code on the Internet was prima facie violation
of EEA); Jennifer Lee, Student Arrested in DirecTV Piracy Case, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at C2
(student arrested for stealing DirecTV trade secrets and posting them on the Internet). The
Department of Justice has been vigorously prosecuting those who violate the EEA. See Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Department of Justice, Economic Espionage Act Cases,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/eeapub.htm (last visited Mar. s, 2007).
129. 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (ruling that Internet speech was entitled to the highest degree of First
Amendment protection and rejecting arguments that the Internet was so dangerous that lower levels
of First Amendment protection should be available).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
secrets as "property," and on caselaw holding that property rights trump
the First Amendment.' 3  Most prominent among the property policy
arguments made in support of categorical immunity is the importance of
preserving trade secrets from misappropriation in order to preserve
adequate incentives to invest in innovation. 3' Rights of exclusion are said
to be important in trade secrecy as in real property contexts.'32 Injunctive
relief is perceived as necessary because loss of trade secrecy may cause
irreparable harm, damages may be difficult to measure, and defendants
may be completely or partially judgment-proof.'33
Because Justice Janice Rogers Brown (now a federal circuit court
judge), writing for the California Supreme Court in Bunner III, arguably
endorsed the property-rights-trump-the-First-Amendment argument, 
34
this Part will first discuss the court's reasoning and then explain why
courts should abjure the property-rights-trump-the-First-Amendment
argument in future cases. Countering this argument is a necessary
prelude to the set of principles Part IV articulates on the proper role of
the First Amendment in trade secret cases.
A. CATEGORICAL IMMUNITY IN BUNNER
All three California courts to consider Bunner's First Amendment
defense made a muddle of it. The trial court did not mention that Bunner
had raised such a defense, let alone explain why Bunner's Internet
posting didn't qualify for First Amendment protection. 35 The Court of
Appeal, by contrast, was so smitten with Bunner's First Amendment
defense that it initially neglected to consider the substantive weaknesses
130. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 8, at 1037. Professor Epstein does not use the term "categorical
immunity," but says that the First Amendment prohibition against prior restraints has no application
at all in trade secret cases. Id. at 1042.
131. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 8, at 5; Epstein, supra note 8, at 1035.
132. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 8, at I2; Epstein, supra note 8, at 1037.
133. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 8, at 29-30; Epstein, supra note 8, at 1038.
134. Bunner III, 75 P.3d I, 11-I6 (Cal. 2003). Justices Werdegar and Moreno wrote concurring
opinions expressing a more liberal view of the role of the First Amendment in trade secret cases. See
id. at 20 (Werdegar, J., concurring) ("[T]he First Amendment does not necessarily preclude injunctive
relief in trade secret cases."); id. at 21-26 (Moreno, J., concurring) (extensively criticizing Justice
Brown's analysis of First Amendment precedents).
135. The trial judge obliquely referred to free speech interests by observing that Bunner et al. were
free to continue to discuss or criticize DVD CCA, the motion picture industry, or DeCSS on their
websites "so long as [CSS] proprietary information ... is not disclosed or distributed." Bunner I, No.
CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512, at *4 (Super. Ct. Cal. 2000). Yet, the judge was not wholly inattentive to
Bunner's First Amendment rights, for he rejected DVD CCA's request to enjoin Bunner and his co-
defendants from linking to websites where CSS information might be found on the ground that such
an order would be "overbroad and extremely burdensome" because "[a] website owner cannot be held
responsible for all of the content of the sites to which it provides links." Id. But see Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434-35 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding an injunction against a
journalist's linking to sites where DeCSS could be found as consistent with the First Amendment).
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of DVD CCA's trade secret claim.' 36 Its First Amendment analysis,
moreover, called into question the constitutionality of all preliminary
injunctions against disclosure of informational trade secrets, not just the
injunction in Bunner.'37 The California Supreme Court rightly chided the
appellate court for neglecting to review the factual record, but then went
overboard in the other direction by concluding that as long as plaintiffs
made an adequate showing of trade secret misappropriation, preliminary
injunctions forbidding disclosure are consistent with the First
Amendment.,8 Neither extreme is sound law.
Bunner II epitomizes what Professor Richard Epstein has called
"First Amendment exceptionalism, '.'39 that is, an overbroad view of the
implications of the First Amendment in trade secret cases. In Bunner II,
the Court of Appeal ruled that DeCSS was First Amendment-protected
speech,'40 and that the preliminary injunction was "a prior restraint on
Bunner's First Amendment right to publish the DeCSS program."''4'
Prior restraints "on pure speech are highly disfavored and presumptively
unconstitutional."'42 To overcome this presumption, "publication must
threaten an interest more fundamental than the First Amendment
136. It assumed, without deciding, that the trial court had correctly concluded that DVD CCA had
established a reasonable probability of success on the merits for the trade secrecy claim. Bunner II,
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 347 (Ct. App. 2001). In Bunner IV, Io Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 192-93 (Ct. App. 2004),
the Court of Appeal decided that DeCSS had been too widely posted on the Internet for too long for
DVD CCA to claim CSS-derived information were protectable secrets. For further discussion, see
infra note 334 and accompanying text.
137. Bunner I1 did not articulate any limiting principles on the scope of First Amendment
protection in trade secret cases. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text for Microsoft's
interpretation of Bunner 11. The decision also erred in expressing no opinion on whether an injunction
against publication of DeCSS might be an appropriate remedy after a full trial on the merits, without
realizing that the availability of DeCSS on the Internet prior to trial would vitiate any secrets from
CSS that the program might contain. See Bunner 11, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351.
138. Bunner 111, 75 P.3d at 11-12.
139. Epstein, supra note 8, at ioo6. He defines this as "the belief that the First Amendment
weights the scales above and beyond what a sensible theory of freedom of speech, understood as part
of a general theory of freedom, would require." Id. Epstein did not discuss Bunner II, as the case was
decided after his article was published. In the context of trade secrecy, Epstein regards "mechanical
application" of prior restraint law, as in Bunner 11, as a manifestation of this phenomenon. Id. at 1042.
Although Robert Post has not commented on First Amendment defenses in trade secret cases, he has
pointed out that the First Amendment does not apply in every case in which liability is predicated on
some speech or communicative act. See, e.g., Post, supra note 13, at 715. Post argues that the social
context in which communication takes place must be taken into account in deciding whether the First
Amendment has salience in cases involving speech and communication. Id.
140. "'Because computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and
ideas about computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amendment."' Bunner 11,
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 (quoting Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2000)). Junger made a
First Amendment challenge to export control laws insofar as they forbade disclosure of encryption
source code without getting a license approval from a government agency. Junger, 209 F.3d at 482.
141. Bunner 11, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350.
142. Id. at 351.
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itself."'43 Because DVD CCA's trade secret interest was not more
fundamental than the First Amendment, "a preliminary injunction
cannot be used to restrict Bunner from disclosing DeCSS."'" No
exception from the prior restraint doctrine had been recognized for trade
secrets,'45 and the caselaw upholding preliminary injunctions in copyright
cases was inapposite because copyright and trade secrecy involve
different statutory frameworks, policy considerations, and constitutional
groundings.' 6
Microsoft and other firms filed an amicus brief in support of DVD
CCA's appeal expressing "alarm[,] that if the lower court's decision is
upheld, its consequences will extend well beyond the unlawful
publication of trade secrets in this case to include a much broader array
of situations in which the intellectual property of American businesses
embedded in trade secrets."' 47 Affirming Bunner II would, they asserted,
risk making California into "a haven for intellectual property thieves."'
' 8
The California Attorney General also submitted a brief arguing for
reversal of the Court of Appeal's ruling.49
It, therefore, came as no surprise that the California Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court's First Amendment ruling. Although it
agreed with the Court of Appeal that DeCSS was First Amendment-
protected speech, "that conclusion still leaves for determination the level
of scrutiny to be applied in determining the constitutionality of an
injunction prohibiting the dissemination of computer code," which
depended on whether the injunction was content neutral or content
based.'50 Justice Brown construed certain Supreme Court decisions as
143. Id.
144. Id. at 352.
145. DeCSS was not "lewd, profane, obscene or libelous, nor did it involve any fighting words,"
and so accepted limitations on First Amendment protection for such speech did not apply. Id. The
court saw no justification for creating a new exception. Id.
146. As set forth by the Court of Appeal in Bunner II:
Both the First Amendment and the Copyright Act are rooted in the U.S. Constitution, but
the UTSA lacks any constitutional basis. The prohibition on disclosure of a trade secret is of
infinite duration, while the copyright protection is strictly limited in time, and there is no
"fair use" exception [in trade secrecy law] as there is for copyrighted material.
Id. at 350; accord Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 158-63 (discussing frequency of preliminary
injunctions in copyright cases).
147. See Brief of Microsoft Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at I-2, Bunner III,
75 P.3d i (Cal. 2003) (No. S102588), available at http://www.eff.orglIPNideofDVDCCAcase/
20020718 bunnerms-amicus.brief.pdf.
148. Id. at 2.
149. See Brief of Attorney General Lockyer as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2-4,
Bunner III, 75 P.3d i (No. S102588), available at http://www.eff.orgfIP/VideofDVDCCA-case/bunner-
ca-ag-amicus.pdf.
15o. Bunner 111, 75 P.3d at ii. Justice Brown also took issue with the Court of Appeal's conclusion
that the preliminary injunction was a prior restraint. See id. at 16-20. This aspect of Bunner III is
discussed infra Part IV.A. Justice Brown may have been influenced by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals's ruling in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, for Justice Brown cited this decision and its
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treating injunctions as content neutral unless they involved government
efforts to censor speech based on its viewpoint.'5 ' She concluded that the
injunction in Bunner was a content-neutral restraint on speech that
passed intermediate scrutiny because trade secrecy law itself was
neutral,'52 the lower court found that Bunner had misappropriated a
trade secret,'53 trade secrets were property,'54 the government had a
significant interest in protecting trade secrets,'55 and the highly technical
nature of the secret made it a matter of only private concern.'
Bunner III characterizes its holding as "quite limited,' 57  and
concludes that "the preliminary injunction does not violate the free
speech clauses of the United States and California Constitutions,
assuming the trial court properly issued the preliminary injunction under
California's trade secrecy law."'. Insofar as this statement implies that
whenever there is an adequate factual basis for issuance of preliminary
injunctions in trade secret cases, there is no need to consider free speech
interests, I strongly disagree, particularly as applied to third party
recipients of misappropriated secrets.'59
Justice Moreno concurred, but expressed strong disagreement with
lower court counterpart several times. See id. at 6-29 (citing 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)). Corley also
applied First Amendment intermediate scrutiny in judging the constitutionality of an injunction
against posting of the same DeCSS code as in Bunner, although the Second Circuit's use of
intermediate scrutiny was primarily based on the functionality of DeCSS. Corley, 273 F.3d at 450-52.
Corley is distinguishable from Bunner in several respects: the injunction in Corley was a permanent
injunction after trial on the merits, not a preliminary injunction, id. at 436, Corley had posted
executable object code rather than source code, id. at 438, and the suit against Corley charged him
with trafficking in circumvention technologies, not posting of trade secrets or information derived
from trade secrets, id. at 435.
i51. Bunner I1, 75 P.3d at ii (relying upon, among others, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781 (1989) (regulation of decibel levels for outdoor concerts did not violate the First
Amendment); Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (994) (upholding injunction
regulating access to abortion clinic against a First Amendment challenge)). Bunner's counsel pointed
out that the Supreme Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper had characterized a wiretap statute as applied to
publication of an illegally intercepted conversation by a person not involved in the misappropriation of
the information as a regulation of "pure speech." Id. at 12-13 (discussing 532 U.S. 514 (2ooo)).
However, Justice Brown pointed out that the Court did not say in Barnicki what level of scrutiny it
was applying and a majority of the Justices supported less than a strict scrutiny approach. Id. at 2-13.
152. Id. at ii ("Our principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government
has adopted a regulation of speech without reference to the content of the regulated speech." (quoting
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
153. Id. ("The underlying basis for the injunction is the trial court's holding that Bunner
misappropriated DVD CCA's property-its trade secrets-in violation of California's trade secrecy
law.").
154- See, e.g., id. at 14 ("The First Amendment does not prohibit courts from incidentally enjoining
speech in order to protect a legitimate property right.").
155. Id. at 10-17.
156. Id. at 15-I6.
157. Id. at i9.
x58. Id. Two Justices stated the holding more narrowly. See infra note x6o.
159. Part IV will explain at length why I disagree with this implication of Bunner III.
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Justice Brown's First Amendment analysis. The decisions on which she
relied, he pointed out, involved time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech,"6 whereas the preliminary injunction in Bunner "is subject-
matter censorship entirely prohibiting Bunner from publishing a
particular type of information."' 6 ' She had, moreover, failed to consider
the availability of alternative venues for communication of this
information, which the Court's time/place/manner precedents require.62
The injunction foreclosed any channel of communication of the
information at issue. Yet, Justice Moreno accepted the property
characterization of trade secrets and cited approvingly decisions that had
"recognized that the First Amendment right to free expression may be
legitimately circumscribed by state law intellectual property rights."'
63
The importance of the trade-secrets-as-property-rights argument as
a justification for lowering the level of scrutiny in trade secret/First
Amendment cases is evident from the more than twenty references to
property rights in core parts of Justice Brown's First Amendment
analysis. I6' Bunner III also approvingly cited two law review articles
endorsing the categorical immunity view of trade secrets and the First
Amendment, both of which heavily rely on the assertion that trade
secrets are property.'
65
It is certainly true that some cases have spoken of trade secrets as
property,' 66 that some real property cases have rejected First Amendment
defenses raised by trespassers engaged in speech or protest activities,67
i6o. Bunner 111, 75 P.3d at 2i (Moreno, J., concurring) ("I concur in the majority's narrow holding,
which as I understand it, is that the First Amendment does not categorically prohibit preliminary
injunctions to enjoin the publication of trade secrets."); see also id. at 21-23 (Moreno, J., concurring)
(discussing Madsen and other decisions on which Justice Brown had relied). Justice Werdegar also
construed the holding in Bunner II to mean "that the First Amendment... does not necessarily
preclude injunctive relief in trade secret cases." Id. at 20 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 23 (Moreno, J., concurring).
162. Id.; see also Volokh, supra note 8, at 702-06 (criticizing Bunner 111, among other cases, for its
analysis of content-neutrality, arguing that injunctions in intellectual property cases are content-based
restrictions on speech).
163. Bunner 111, 75 P.3d at 24. Yet, a long footnote referred to the Court of Appeal's reasons for
distinguishing trade secrets and copyrights vis-A-vis injunctive relief. Id. at 23 n.t.
164. See, e.g., id. at it ("Bunner misappropriated DVD CCA's property...."); id. (characterizing
trade secrets as a property right and referring to "DVD CCA's statutorily created property right"); id.
at 12 ("[T]he specific deprivation to be remedied is the misappropriation of a property interest in
information."); id. at 13 (characterizing trade secrets as "'a constitutionally protected intangible
property interest"); id. (trade secret law creates "a limited property right in information"); id. at 14
("[T]he right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the property interest." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at toii)); see also supra notes 150-51.
165. Bunner 111, 75 P.3 d at 12 (citing Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 8); id. at 15 (citing Epstein,
supra note 8).
166. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-o4 (1984) (holding that reports
and data on safety claimed as trade secrets were property for purposes of Fifth Amendment takings
analysis).
167. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568-70 (1972) (holding that mall owner
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and that certain decisions have opined that there is no First Amendment
right to infringe intellectual property rights.' 68 But other cases challenge
the first and third propositions and the second has less force than its
proponents are willing to concede.
Part III.B explains why trade secrecy law is better understood as a
species of unfair competition law, not as "property" right analogous to
land in the trespass cases or even to "true" intellectual property laws,
such as patents and copyrights, for the purposes of analyzing First
Amendment defenses. Because of its grounding in unfair competition
principles, trade secrecy law has a far more limited scope than patents
and copyrights, let alone real property. To strengthen trade secret rights
so that they become more property-like increases the likelihood of
federal preemption as well as of conflicts with the First Amendment.
Part III.C goes on to discuss why, even if one accepts that trade
secrets are sometimes treated as "property," this does not mean that
claims for trade secrecy misappropriation are immune from First
Amendment scrutiny. There is a more substantial caselaw giving
credence to First Amendment defenses in intellectual property cases
than the property-rights-trumps-the-First-Amendment view recognizes.
A. TRADE SECRETS ARE NOT "PROPERTY" AKIN TO PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS
OR LAND
Trade secrecy law emerged as a common law cause of action in the
United States in the nineteenth century to provide remedies for two
common forms of unfair competition: the use of improper means, such as
bribery or deceit, to obtain another's valuable secret, and abuse of a
confidence or contract under which another's valuable secrets had been
disclosed. '69 Regulating improper acquisition of secrets and enforcing
confidential relationships continue to be the core interests protected by
trade secrecy law. 7' This is significantly different from what real
property, patent, and copyright laws do.
Justice Holmes famously criticized the "property" characterization
for trade secrets in E.L du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland:
The word property as applied to... trade secrets is an unanalyzed
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that
the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether
the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not, the defendant knows the
had the right to exclude the distribution of handbills by anti-war protestors from its premises).
168. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 6oo F.2d 1184, 1188
(5th Cir. 1979) (holding that there is no First Amendment right to infringe trademarks).
169. See, e.g., Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 13-14 (N.Y. 1889) (finding misappropriation of trade
secrets where the defendant abused a confidential relationship by measuring and copying plaintiff's
patterns and using the copies to make pipes that competed with plaintiff's pipes).
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1993).
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facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted.
The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore,
the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process
of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiffs.'
7'
The American Law Institute took a similar view in its 1939
Restatement of Torts:
The suggestion that one has a right to exclude others from the use of
his trade secret because he has a right of property in the idea has
frequently been advanced and rejected. The theory that has prevailed
is that the protection is afforded only by a general duty of good faith
and that liability rests upon breach of this duty.'
72
The more recent Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 173 does not
take a stand on the trade secrets as property debate, but it observes that
"[t]he dispute over the nature of trade secret rights has had little
practical effect on the rules governing civil liability for the appropriation
of a trade secret.' ' 174 Courts may characterize trade secrets as property
because the secrets have value,'75 but they treat such rights as "effective
only against defendants who used or acquired the information
improperly." 176
An important respect in which trade secret law differs from real
property and intellectual property laws is that the former does not grant
developers any exclusive rights in their secrets, no matter how costly and
time-consuming it may have been to develop the secrets or how valuable
they are to their developers. Trade secrets are more properly
characterized as "nonexclusive rights.'
' 77
Copyrights and patents, by contrast, are "property" rights because
the Constitution explicitly gives Congress power to grant authors and
inventors "exclusive rights" in their writings and discoveries,7 and
Congress has implemented this constitutional power by explicitly
granting qualifying innovators a set of exclusive rights to control certain
exploitations of the protected innovations.' 79 Patentees and copyright
holders can exercise the right to exclude unauthorized persons from
trespassing upon their rights, just as owners of real property can exclude
unauthorized persons from their lands,"" but all trade secret developers
171. 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
172. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 39 cmt. b (993).
174. Id.; see also POOLEY, supra note 40, at 1-20.
175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1993).
176. Id.
177. MILGRIM, supra note 9, § 9.0215][a].
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
179. See 17 U.S.C. § lo6 (20o0) (setting forth exclusive rights of copyright); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000)
(setting forth exclusive rights of patent owners).
18o. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.1, at 411-13
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can do is sue those who use improper means to get the secrets or breach
a contract or confidence. Although trade secret law is sometimes
clustered for the sake of convenience under the general rubric of
"intellectual property" rights, this does not alter the essential nature of
trade secrets as a form of unfair competition.
Insofar as trade secret law evolves to treating intangible interests in
information as "property," the risk grows that trade secret law will come
into conflict with federal intellectual property law. Consider, for
example, the secrets at issue in Bunner. Copyright law would certainly
consider the program CSS to be protectable property insofar as it is an
original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression, 
s8
but the algorithms and data embodied in the program-the very things
that DVD CCA claimed that Bunner misappropriated-would not be
within the scope of property rights provided by copyright law. Copyright
law specifically states that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work. ' 8' Facts and data are equally unprotectable elements of
copyrighted works.' U.S. Supreme Court decisions, moreover, have
characterized facts, data, and ideas as constitutionally unprotectable
subject matters. I" So if state trade secret law propertizes elements of
works that the Supreme Court asserts are constitutionally unprotectable
as property, trade secret law may be preempted by federal law as well as
being in conflict with the First Amendment.' 5
This is not to say that any time a state court refers to trade secrets as
property, its statement is constitutionally suspect, but courts should use
(3d ed. 2000).
181. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
182. Id. § 102(b). The algorithms in CSS would be unprotectable processes or procedures in the
program. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834-37 (ioth Cir. 1993).
Under Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), program algorithms would also be unpatentable as
mathematical ideas. Even if one believes that Benson is no longer good law, it is fair to say that the
CSS algorithms are unpatentable (and hence unpropertizable as a matter of federal patent law)
because they have been in commercial use for several years. See 35 U.S.C. § r02(b). Thus, as a matter
of patent law, the CSS algorithms cannot be federally protected property either. They should be
protectable as trade secrets only so long as they are secrets, which they no longer are.
183. See, e.g., Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340,349 (1991).
184. See, e.g., id. at 349 (characterizing the unprotectability of facts as "the essence of copyright
and a constitutional requirement" (citations omitted)); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (985) (noting that copyright law does not conflict with the First Amendment
because copyright doesn't protect ideas and facts). Many commentators regard facts and ideas as
constitutionally protected elements of the public domain. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Enriching
Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006) (discussing concepts of the constitutionally
protected public domain that includes ideas and information).
185. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (concerning preemption and First Amendment
concerns arising when trade secret law is strengthened).
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the "property" word carefully and be specific about the scope of rights
under consideration. As Justice Holmes observed almost a century ago,
use of the term property to describe trade secrets is generally an
"unanalyzed expression.""
B. TRADE SECRETS MAY BE "PROPERTY" FOR SOME PURPOSES, BUT THIS
DOES NOT IMMUNIZE TRADE SECRET CLAIMS FROM FIRST AMENDMENT
CHALLENGES
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,"" the Supreme Court observed that
trade secrets exhibit some characteristics of property. They can, for
example, be assigned, form the res of a trust, and pass to trustees in
bankruptcy. 'm More importantly, the Court held that trade secrets were
eligible for treatment as property for purposes of determining whether
government use or disclosure of them was compatible with the Fifth
Amendment.'89
Monsanto challenged legislation that authorized the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to do two things: (I) look at and make use of
studies that Monsanto had submitted to the agency about the safety,
efficacy, and environmental impacts of fungicides and pesticides when
seeking approval to sell these chemicals in considering competitors'
applications for approval to sell chemical equivalents,'" and (2) disclose
Monsanto's studies to the public if the EPA deemed such disclosure
necessary to address health, safety, or environmental concerns. 9'
Monsanto considered both rules to be unconstitutional "takings" of its
private property.
92
The Court decided that the rules allowing governmental use and
disclosure of this trade secret information did not constitute a taking
insofar as the government had not specifically promised not to use or
186. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
187. 467 U.S. 986, 986 (1984) (applying Fifth Amendment takings analysis to legislation regulating
uses that could be made of safety data submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency in
connection with approval of fungicides).
t88. Id. at 1002.
189. Id. at 1002-04. Other intangible interests, such as a materialman's lien and contracts, have
been treated as "property" for purposes of assessing Fifth Amendment takings claims. Id. at 1003. But
see Pamela Samuelson, Information As Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing
Direction in the Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 365 (1989) (criticizing the Court's analysis in Ruckelshaus
of trade secrets as property and the mischief this characterization might wreak unless narrowly
construed).
19o. The challenged provisions were part of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA). The data-consideration rules were in § 3(c)(I)(D) of FIFRA.
191. See 7 U.S.C. § 136g (2000); see id. § 136a(c)(2)(A) (containing the data-disclosure provisions).
192. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 998-99 (noting that Monsanto alleged that all of the challenged
provisions were unconstitutional takings and sought injunctive relief against the EPA's use of those
provisions and asserted the uses permitted were for private, rather than public, purposes).
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disclose the data submitted to the EPA.'93 The absence of such a promise
meant that Monsanto did not have an investment-backed expectation
that its secrets would not be used or disclosed by the EPA for those
purposes.'94 There was, however, a five-year period in which the statute
did promise that trade secret data submitted to the EPA would not be
used in assessing competing applications or disclosed to the public.'95 Yet,
even as to data submitted during this period, the Court went on to rule
that the EPA could, in fact, use such data in considering competing
applications and disclose the data to the public if necessary to respond to
health and safety concerns. Use and disclosure of data submitted in these
five years was a taking, but it was a taking for a public purpose. ' Hence,
the government could still use or disclose this data as long as it
compensated Monsanto. 7
While proponents of the trade-secrets-as-property conception tend
to invoke Ruckelshaus as supporting the property concept, '98 a fuller
review of the Court's ruling demonstrates that trade secret interests are
balanced against other societal interests, and sometimes the larger
societal interests override trade secret interests. The strong property
right theory that Monsanto propounded was soundly trounced in
Ruckelshaus. The Court in Ruckelshaus found the public interest in
competition and public access to health and safety data more compelling
than Monsanto's commercial interests in non-disclosure except insofar as
the government explicitly promised during one five-year period not to
use or disclose trade secret information submitted to the EPA.'99
The public interest in access to newsworthy information is among
the public policies with which courts must occasionally grapple in trade
secret cases. In O'Grady v. Superior Court, for instance, Apple
Computer claimed that there was not and could not be a public interest
in access to any of its proprietary trade secrets that O'Grady published
on his website." The court responded that "[s]urely this statement
cannot stand as a categorical proposition'."" Sometimes "[t]imely
disclosure [of trade secrets] might avert the infliction of harm on many
193. Id. at ioo4-o8. Prior to 1972, FIFRA was silent on whether the EPA could use or disclose this
data. The Court construed this silence too as giving Monsanto no investment-backed expectation of
non-use or non-disclosure. Id. at too8-io.
194. Id. at ioo6.
195. Id. at 1010-12.
196. Id. at 1012-16.
197. Id. at IOI6-i9 (holding that Monsanto could seek compensation under the Tucker Act in the
Court of Claims).
198. See, e.g., Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 8, at 21 n.95.
199. Ruckelshaus, 476 U.S. at Io4-i6.
20o. 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 112 (Ct. App. 2006).
2O1. Id.
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thousands of individuals .... Merely labeling the secrets as "confidential"
or "proprietary" or quoting caselaw characterizing trade secrets as
property rights "cannot drain them of compelling public interest."2"
O'Grady involved "not a purely private theft of secrets for venal
advantage, but a journalistic disclosure to, in the trial court's words, 'an
interested public."' °  When both property and free speech interests
cannot be accommodated, "it is the quasi-property right that must give
way, not the deeply rooted constitutional right to share and acquire
information.""°
Professor Volokh has observed that simply "[c]alling a speech
restriction a 'property right' ... doesn't make it any less a sTeech
restriction, and it doesn't make it constitutionally permissible."' The
First Amendment has an especially important role to play when the
question is not where certain speech activities can take place (e.g., on the
plaintiff's real property as in the trespass cases), but rather whether
certain speech activities can take place at all (e.g., disclosing information
claimed as a trade secret to the public). First Amendment defenses have,
moreover, been successful in many intellectual property cases,"
202. Id.
203. Id. In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the California Supreme Court rejected arguments based on
analogizing unauthorized email communications by former employee to current employees of Intel as
akin to trespass to real property. 71 P.3d 296, 308-12 (Cal. 2003). The court considered the free speech
implications of enjoining unauthorized emails as trespasses to computers in ruling against Intel. Id. at
311-12. Justice Brown's dissent in that case emphasized the desirability of protecting property rights.
Id. at 313-25 (Brown, J., dissenting).
204. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 112.
2o5. Id. Third party disclosure of trade secrets is discussed infra Part IV.E.
2o6. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a
Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, IO63 (2000). Volokh points out
that characterizing Sullivan's interest in his reputation as a property interest wouldn't strengthen his
libel claim against the New York Times, nor would characterizing the American flag as intellectual
property of the United States change the First Amendment implications of flag burning. Id. at io63-
64; see also Volokh, supra note 8, at 700 (giving examples of strategic uses of the property metaphor to
try to change outcomes in First Amendment cases); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 182-85 (critical
of view that designating copyright as property is a basis for ruling that the First Amendment has no
application).
2o7. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2o03) (holding that First
Amendment overrides publicity rights claim as to print of Tiger Woods); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., 296 F.3 d 894, 901, 904 (9 th Cir. 2002) (holding that First Amendment limits trademark
and dilution law to permit expressive uses of marks such as song about Barbie dolls); Cardtoons L.C.
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3 d 959, 969 (Ioth Cir. 1996) (holding that First
Amendment interests of maker of parody baseball cards outweighed players' publicity rights
interests); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 81i F.2d 26, 29 (ist Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1013 (1987) (holding that the First Amendment limits the scope of dilution law as applied to
sexual parody of catalog); Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp.
1112, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. I98O) (holding that First Amendment speech interests supported allowing use of
Olympic symbol in protest against building a prison on a former Olympic site); Hicks v. Casablanca
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (denying right of publicity claim brought by heirs of
Agatha Christie against maker of film about an episode in her life based in part on First Amendment
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including in trade secret cases."
Leading intellectual property scholars have argued that courts have
been too quick to grant preliminary injunctions in both copyright and
trade secret cases and insufficiently sensitive to free speech
considerations, in large part because they have relied too heavily on the
weak crutch of the property rights metaphor."° In Eldred v. Ashcroft,
moreover, the Supreme Court explicitly criticized the D.C. Circuit for its
assertion that copyright law is categorically immune from First
Amendment challenges. ' ° This suggests the Court would repudiate a
similar theory in respect of trade secrets.
IV. RETHINKING THE PRIOR RESTRAINTS DOCTRINE AS
APPLIED TO TRADE SECRETS
This Part argues that preliminary injunctions against public
disclosure of informational trade secrets may be prior restraints on
speech. The heavy presumption against prior restraints is sometimes
appropriate in trade secrecy cases, especially those involving third party
publishers of newsworthy information misappropriated by a second
party.
A. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS FORBIDDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF
INFORMATIONAL TRADE SECRETS MAY BE PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON SPEECH
CBS, Inc. v. Davis ruled that a preliminary injunction against public
disclosure of informational trade secrets was a prior restraint on speech
that bore a heavy presumption against constitutional validity under the
First Amendment."' All but one of the seven reported decisions to have
considered this question have agreed with CBS on this point."'
considerations).
208. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
209. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 182-84.
210. 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2oo3), reh'g denied, 538 U.S. 916 (2003).
211. 510 U.S. 1315,1317 (1994).
212. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 , 224-25 (6th Cit. 1996)
(holding preliminary injunction against Business Week's publication of information derived from
documents said to constitute trade secrets and confidential information to be an unconstitutional prior
restraint); Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (denying Ford's motion
for preliminary injunction against disclosure of trade secret information as prior restraint); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 26o, 262 (E.D. Va. 1995) (denying preliminary injunction in trade
secrecy and copyright infringement against Washington Post, characterizing requested injunction as a
prior restraint); State ex reL Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304, 13o8 (Or. 1996)
(overturning preliminary injunction as a prior restraint against publication of information by
newsletter that had been disclosed in breach of employee confidence); Garth v. Staktek Corp., 876
S.W.2d 545, 549-50 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding preliminary injunction was prior restraint, but showing
adequate to overcome this restraint); see also Bridge C.A.T. Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 710
F.2d 940, 945-46 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding no exception from prior restraint doctrine for trade secrets).
But see Bunner III, 75 P.3d 1, I8 (Cal. 2003) (opining that a preliminary injunction against public
dissemination of alleged trade secrets was not a prior restraint on speech).
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In CBS, a state court preliminarily enjoined the network from
broadcasting or otherwise revealing videotape footage it obtained by
persuading an employee of Federal Beef Processors to wear and use
undercover camera equipment in the plant during his work shift.213 After
learning of CBS's intent to feature this footage in a television news
program, Federal sued to enjoin the broadcast, alleging, among other
things, that the tape revealed "'Federal's confidential and proprietary
practices and processes... in violation of South Dakota trade secret law
and that broadcast of the tape would cause it irreparable injury."4 The
South Dakota court granted the preliminary injunction "because the
videotape 'was obtained by CBS, at the very least, through calculated
misdeeds,"' which made "conventional First Amendment prior restraint
doctrine ... inapplicable." '215
Justice Blackmun granted CBS's motion for an emergency stay of
this preliminary injunction so that the broadcast could take place as
scheduled, saying:
Although the prohibition against prior restraints is by no means
absolute, it has been considered acceptable only in "exceptional cases."
Even where questions of allegedly urgent national security or
competing constitutional interests, we have imposed this "most
extraordinary remedy" only where the evil that would result from the
reportage is both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less
intrusive measures.2"
Even if "economic harm were sufficient in itself to justify a prior
restraint," Justice Blackmun concluded, "speculative predictions" about
harm are insufficient." 8 Although accepting that the court below was "no
doubt... correct that broadcast of the videotape 'could' result in
significant economic harm to Federal,"'. 19 Justice Blackmun was not
convinced that this proof satisfied constitutional standards.
Nor did CBS's alleged misdeeds render prior restraints doctrine
inapplicable. "Subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior
restraints, ordinarily are the appropriate sanction for... misdeeds in the
First Amendment context ..... Had CBS engaged in criminal activity to
obtain the videotape, this "could justify an exception to the prior
restraint doctrine," he opined, but "the record as developed thus far
contains no clear evidence of criminal activity on the part of CBS, and




217. Id. at 1317 (internal citations omitted).
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the court below found none .... 
Justice Blackmun's pronouncements about the applicability of the
prior restraint doctrine in informational trade secret cases are
particularly notable given that he was among the dissenting justices in
New York Times Co. v. United States who would have been willing to
enjoin the Times' publication of the Pentagon Papers.222 One might thus
have expected Justice Blackmun to construe prior restraints doctrine
more narrowly than his brethren. Yet, not only did he think the prior
restraint doctrine applied, but he also intimated that First Amendment
considerations required a more rigorous showing of likelihood of success
on the merits and of irreparable harm before issuing preliminary
injunctions to stop public disclosure of trade secrets.223
The CBS case also illustrates the risk of court-enforced private
censorship that may lurk in the background of some trade secret cases.
Viewed in a light favorably to CBS, one might perceive the plaintiff in
CBS as having alleged trade secret misappropriation and sought an
injunction in order to avoid embarrassment or other harm to the firm's
reputation if a news broadcast raised public awareness about unsanitary
or brutal conditions inside its meatpacking factory. CBS was, in this view,
giving the public access to information in which it had a legitimate
interest in knowing, not misappropriating trade secrets.
The only decision to have concluded that preliminary injunctions
against public disclosure of trade secrets are not prior restraints on
speech is the opinion of Justice Brown in Bunner III. Although she
acknowledged that CBS and other decisions characterized trade secret
preliminary injunctions as prior restraints, "4 she construed certain
subsequent decisions by the Court as limiting the prior restraint doctrine
to instances in which the government was attempting to censor speech
based on its content."5 Moreover, "[a]s a single Justice order, CBS is
221. Id.; accord Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449 F.3d 245, 249 (9th Cir. I7) ("The First Amendment
has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the
course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by
electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office.")
222. See 403 U.S. 713, 759-63 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's principal
concern was that the case had been adjudicated in haste and with pressure, panic, and sensationalism
that did not allow for proper judicial consideration. Id. at 76o-6x. He would have remanded the case
for expeditious proceedings after some discovery and an orderly presentation of evidence and
argumentation. Id. at 761-62. He also expressed concern about the harm that publication of the
Pentagon Papers might do to the lives of soldiers. Id. at 762-63. Justice Blackmun also joined Justice
Harlan's dissent. Id. at 752.
223. See infra notes 394-95 and accompanying text for further discussion of this point.
224. Bunner III, 75 P.3d 1, i8 (Cal. 2003). Justices Werdegar and Moreno concurred in the court's
judgment but took issue with Justice Brown's prior restraint analysis. See id. at 20-28 (Werdegar &
Moreno, JJ., concurring).
225. Justice Brown opined that as long as the law under which the injunction was issued was
content-neutral and the defendant violated that law, the injunction should be regarded as a content-
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arguably not binding on this court.'226 She also distinguished CBS as a
case involving weak evidence of misappropriation.
Justice Brown's analysis of the prior restraint doctrine and of CBS is
simply wrong. Numerous courts, including the California Supreme Court,
have characterized preliminary injunctions as prior restraints in cases
involving private litigants where there was no contention or danger of
governmental suppression of speech."" The subsequent Supreme Court
decisions on which she relied involved time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech, not rulings that forbade certain speech altogether,
as did the injunction in Bunner.29 While Justice Blackmun regarded the
evidence of harm in CBS as speculative,"' he did not challenge the lower
court's finding about the use of improper means to obtain information
Federal claimed as a trade secret. Thus, Justice Brown's analysis is
flawed and should not be followed in subsequent cases.
B. A HEAVY PRESUMPTION AGAINST ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS SHOULD NOT APPLY IN ORDINARY TRADE SECRET CASES
CBS, Inc. v. Davis is a highly unusual trade secrecy case in that: (i)
the alleged misappropriator was a news organization, (2) its intent was to
broadcast footage containing the alleged secrets, (3) conditions inside
meatpacking firms were newsworthy matters of public concern, (4) the
neutral restriction on speech, not a prior restraint. Id. at 17-i8 (majority opinion) (citing Thomas v.
Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321-22 (2002) (holding that licensing scheme was not a prior
restraint because it was "not subject matter censorship, but content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulation") and Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 374 n.6 (1997) (holding
that preliminary injunction regulating protests outside of abortion clinic was not unconstitutional
because it was issued "not because of the content of petitioners' expression... but because of their
prior unlawful conduct")).
226. Bunner 111, 75 P.3d. at 18.
227. Id.
228. See e.g., id. at 23 n.i (Moreno, J., concurring) (citing Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Local
too, Hotel & Rest. Employees Int'l Union, 239 F.3 d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2ooi) (preliminary injunction
against publication treated as a prior restraint in litigation between private parties)); see also CBS, Inc.
v. Davis, 51O U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994) (granting emergency stay of preliminary injunction against
broadcast of videotape found to contain trade secret information as unconstitutional prior restraint);
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 45, 419-20 (97 0 (temporary injunction against leafleting
in private litigation for invasion of privacy held to be unconstitutional prior restraint); Bridge C.A.T.
Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 71o F.2d 94o, 946 (2d Cir. 8983) (improperly issued protective order
in private litigation was unconstitutional prior restraint on speech); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8
(citing cases and analyzing policies underlying prior restraint law). Justice Brown's treatment of the
prior restraint doctrine is inconsistent with prior decisions by the California Supreme Court. See
Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 859-62 (Cal. 1999) (upholding permanent
injunction forbidding use of racial epithets after trial on the merits, but recognizing that preliminary
injunctions in civil litigations may be unconstitutional prior restraints); Wilson v. Superior Court, 532
P.2d I16, 120 (Cal. 1975) (preliminary injunction against distribution of newsletter held to be an
unconstitutional prior restraint in libel case).
229. See Bunner 111, 75 P.3d at 21-22 (Moreno, J., concurring) (discussing these cases).
230. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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harm that might arise from disclosure was speculative, and (5) such harm
as occurred would most likely not be attributable to the loss of trade
secrets. 3 '
In ordinary trade secret cases, by contrast, trade secret defendants
will be (i) private profit-making firms or individuals who work for or
with such firms (2) who intend to make private uses or disclosures of
another firm's secrets (3) as to information that is neither newsworthy
nor a matter of public concern and (4) who have breached an
enforceable contract to maintain secrecy, abused the confidence under
which they received another's trade secrets, and/or used improper
means, such as bribery or fraud, to obtain the secrets (5) under
circumstances likely to give rise to substantial and irreparable harm
arising from the defendants' competitive uses of the secret that are not
easily monitored. 32
A preliminary injunction is often necessary to protect trade secrets
from further misuses and/or to preserve the status quo pending final
adjudication of the dispute between the parties. Enjoining disclosure of
trade secrets is generally important to preserving adequate incentives for
firms to invest in research and development as well as to enforce basic
norms of commercial ethics.233 Thus, courts should not apply the prior
restraints doctrine in cases involving a confluence of these ordinary trade
secret factors."M
Garth v. Staktek Corp is an example of an ordinary trade secret case
in which a First Amendment defense was properly rejected.35 Garth was
231. Douglas Lichtman, Professor, University of Chicago Law School, Comments at the Berkeley
Center for Law & Technology Trade Secrecy Workshop (Oct. 13, 2006). Prof. Lichtman has suggested
that perhaps liability for misappropriation in such cases should turn on whether it was really necessary
for the information to be revealed as part of the news story. Id. However, there will be times, and the
CBS tape of Federal's plant may be one of them, in which disclosure of some secret may be incidental
to an otherwise significant news story. In addition, necessity often may be hotly debated. To reveal
details may add credibility to a story that would otherwise seem too vague about the threat to public
health or other social interest.
232. Commercial use in competition with the trade secret developer is, of course, not a necessary
element for trade secret misappropriation, so the mere absence of competitive uses should not, of
itself, lead courts to deny preliminary injunctions. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 40 cmt. c (1993). Yet, the absence of competitive use makes these kinds of trade secret cases
different from the ordinary claim and so closer scrutiny of the claim and the injunction being sought is
warranted.
233. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974); see also Epstein, supra
note 8, at 1036-38. 1 agree with Professor Epstein that First Amendment "exceptionalism" should not
lead courts to deny preliminary injunctions in ordinary trade secret cases.
234. This exception is akin to that which Professors Lemley and Volokh proposed for
straightforward copyright infringement cases (e.g., literal copying of the whole work or unauthorized
public performance where fair use is not a plausible defense). See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at
151. CBS, Inc. v. Davis proposes a further exception from the prior restraint doctrine if the defendant
engaged in criminal activity. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
235. 876 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App. I994); accord Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278
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a former participant in a joint venture to develop three-dimensional
high-density memory packages for mini- and microcomputer applications
who signed an agreement not to use or disclose information generated
and exchanged during the venture unless it had become public domain
information.236 Staktek, a successor-in-interest to the joint venture, sued
Garth and his new employer for trade secret misappropriation and
sought preliminary injunctive relief.237 After finding that Garth violated
the non-disclosure agreement by using and disclosing the venture's
secrets to his new firm, the trial court granted the motion. On appeal,
Garth and the firm argued that the preliminary injunction against further
use or disclosure of Staktek's trade secrets was an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech.238
The Texas Court of Appeals stated that it was well-settled under
Texas law that "injunctive relief may be employed when one breaches his
confidential relationship in order to unfairly use a trade secret, ' 39 but
recognized that this rule needed to be consistent with the First
Amendment and the Texas Constitution. "Texas law begins with the
presumption that prior restraints on free speech are unconstitutional,"
said the court, but "prior restraints may be permitted to prevent an
imminent and irreparable harm, so long as no less restrictive alternative
form of protection is available., 24° It added: "Monetary compensation
may not sufficiently protect the creator of a new product from unfair
competition by those who improperly appropriate confidential
information."'"
Because Garth's firm had attempted to sell the protected technology
to other firms, the appellate court agreed that there was irreparable harm
from the defendants' pattern of improper uses of the secret and there
appeared to be no less restrictive way than a preliminary injunction to
ensure that the defendants would not continue to misuse the secrets.42
Garth v. Statek exhibits all five characteristics of an ordinary trade secret
case that justifies not applying the prior restraint doctrine's heavy
presumption of unconstitutionality.
N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979) (rejecting First Amendment defense in trade secret case because of
defendant's breach of a confidential relationship obligation).
236. Garth, 876 S.w.2d at 547.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 549.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 550.
242. Id.
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C. IN RARE CASES, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AGAINST PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED BY WRONGFUL MEANS OR IN
BREACH OF CONTRACTS OR CONFIDENCES WILL BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
PRIOR RESTRAINTS
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition affirms the
appropriateness of preliminary injunctions to prevent direct
misappropriators of trade secrets from benefiting from their own
misconduct."3 Lerma, among other cases, endorses this principle." In
ordinary trade secret cases, wrongful conduct will be an important factor
in the issuance of a preliminary injunction.245
Yet, direct misappropriators of trade secrets have sometimes
successfully invoked the prior restraints doctrine. In CBS, for instance,
Justice Blackmun vacated a preliminary injunction forbidding the
network from broadcasting a videotape of meatpacking operations even
though the state court found it had been obtained through misdeeds." 6
CBS thus suggests that courts should not adopt a blanket rule that
preliminary injunctions are always appropriate against direct
misappropriators who obtained trade secrets by wrongful means.
A factor weighing in favor of preliminary injunctions in cases
involving public disclosures of trade secrets in breach of contractual or
confidential obligations is the policy that "[p]eople should... be
required to abide by their own promises. '  Enforcing contracts "helps
preserve the potentially beneficial effects of confidentiality, and it fits our
traditional conclusion that people are entitled to voluntarily waive their
243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 cmt. c (1993) ("If a trade secret has
already entered the public domain, an injunction may be appropriate to remedy any head start or
other unfair advantage acquired by the defendant as a result of the misappropriation.").
244. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 9o8 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (E.D. Va. 1995) (distinguishing a
preliminary injunction against a direct misappropriator from that against third party recipients, such as
the Washington Post); see also Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 950,
955 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (endorsing injunction against a direct misappropriator despite general
publication).
245. Courts should, for example, take into account whether someone who obtains a secret by
wrongful means intends to publish the secret as an act of revenge against a firm or for other wrongful
purposes.
246. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 51o U.S. 1315, 5318 (1994). Justice Blackmun indicated that he would
recognize an exception to the prior restraints doctrine for criminal acts. Id. at 1316. Justice Blackmun
did not explain why he made this distinction, but criminal wrongdoing may change the public interest
calculus in preliminary injunction analysis. See also State ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nachtigal,
921 P.2d 1304, 13o9 n.8 (Or. 1996) (criminal acts might alter whether a preliminary injunction was an
unconstitutional prior restraint).
247. Volokh, supra note 8, at 741. Yet, Volokh argued elsewhere that "as a general matter,
preliminary injunctions justified by the possibility that the defendant's speech breaches a contract are
no more warranted than preliminary injunctions justified by the possibility that the defendant's speech
is libelous." Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 232. Post would seem to take issue with this position.
See, e.g., Post, supra note 13, at 715.
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constitutional rights and to get the benefits that such waivers may
provide them."" Caselaw can be found in support of this proposition,
albeit in dicta. In State ex rel. Sports Management News, Inc. v. Nachtigal,
for instance, the Oregon Supreme Court observed that the parties had
debated "whether the constitution historically would permit a prior
restraint on speech.., if issued against an [A]didas employee, bound to
confidentiality, who sought to disclose the alleged trade secrets."' 9 The
court hinted, without deciding, that such an injunction would be valid.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. might initially seem to support this
position.5 Cohen sued Cowles Media for damages after he was fired
from his job working for a candidate for governor because Cowles's
newspapers disclosed, in breach of a promise of anonymity, that Cohen
was a key source for a story Cowles published about charges levied
against a candidate for lieutenant governor.51 The Court allowed Cohen
to proceed with his claims for damages suffered as a result of Cowles's
breach of this promise.25 However, nothing in the decision suggests that
the Court would have upheld a preliminary injunction against Cowles's
publication of Cohen's name because it had promised not to do so.
Because the Court was so deeply split (5-4) on whether Cohen could
recover damages for breach of this promise,53 it is doubtful that the
Court would have upheld a prior restraint on publication of this
information by the newspapers. 54
In ordinary trade secrecy cases, persons under contractual or
confidential relationship obligations can be preliminarily enjoined from
248. Volokh, supra note 8, at 741.
249. 921 P.2d at 53o9 n.8; accord Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 75o n.6 (E.D. Mich.
1999).
250. 501 U.S. 663 (i99i); accord Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984) (rejecting
First Amendment challenge to order requiring the Times not to disclose newsworthy information
disclosed under seal during discovery); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 5o7, 51o (198o) (upholding
injunction enforcing contract not to disclose secrets obtained during governmental service in the CIA
because "Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely high degree of trust"). But see
Penguin Books USA, Inc. v. Walsh, 756 F. Supp. 770, 786--88 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that former
government lawyer could publish a book on his experiences as a prosecutor notwithstanding a
prepublication agreement to submit drafts for clearance by government agency; distinguishing Snepp).
251. Cowles Media, 5oi U.S. at 665-66.
252. Id. at 67z.
253. Id. at 67o-71. The Court ruled that the law of promissory estoppel in Minnesota was a
content-neutral law of general applicability, and that the First Amendment did not forbid its
application to the press. Id. at 670. Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Souter and O'Connor dissented. Id. at
67o (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 676 (Souter, J., dissenting).
254. The dissenters objected to the "talismanic" invocation of the content-neutrality of promissory
estoppel, saying that "such laws may restrict First Amendment rights just as effectively as those
directed specifically at speech itself," and it was "necessary to articulate, measure, and compare the
competing interests involved in any given case to determine the legitimacy of burdening constitutional
interests." Id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting). But see Epstein, supra note 8, at 1033 (concluding that
persons in Cohen's situation should be entitled to a preliminary injunction against disclosure of
identity if this would breach a contract).
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private disclosure of non-newsworthy secrets without offending the First
Amendment because the social context of such disclosures does not
implicate First Amendment values.55 Yet, when significant public
interests in disclosure are at stake, those who have contracted not to
disclose information or who received the information in confidence may
sometimes be justified in disclosing it. '56 Suppose, for instance, that a
former tobacco industry executive revealed in an Internet blog
information about trade secret-protected studies conducted by his prior
firm that showed harmful health impacts of smoking.57 Disclosure of this
information would certainly vitiate the trade secret, and it might also
violate a confidentiality agreement between the executive and his firm.
The firm might sue the executive for trade secret misappropriation and
move for a preliminary injunction to require the executive to take down
this posting. A court considering such a motion might invoke CBS, Inc. v.
Davis and other prior restraints precedents in denying the firm's
motion.25 8
There may thus be some, albeit rare, circumstances in which a court
would and should uphold First Amendment defenses in trade secrecy
cases notwithstanding contractual or confidential non-disclosure
obligations. It would be odd if courts were more willing to allow trade
secrets to be dissipated by those who obtained the information by
wrongful means, as in CBS, than by those who obtained the information
in confidence or under contract, especially since the scope of a contract
or of a confidence may not shimmer with clarity.
255. The Supreme Court has sometimes upheld regulatory regimes that authorize prior restraints
when the legal standards are rigorous and there are procedural safeguards in place "designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (striking
down a motion picture licensing regime because of long delays before judicial review of decision by
censorship board). The Court upheld a statutory scheme permitting pre-publication injunctions of
allegedly obscene books during the pendency of litigation as to whether specific works were obscene
because the legal standards were clear and procedures had been established to ensure expeditious
adjudication. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440 (1957). Decisions such as Kingsley
suggest that the Court would find preliminary injunctions in trade secret cases to be generally
justifiable as long as standards for issuance of preliminary injunctions in trade secret cases are clear
and procedures are suitably expeditious. However, these decisions predate New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (ix7), and its progeny, and their continued precedential significance is
unclear.
256. Cf Penguin Books USA Inc. v. Walsh, 756 F. Supp. 770, 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that
unreasonable delays and demands for excising material by government office that was contractually
entitled to pre-publication review writings of former employee about his work conflicted with the First
Amendment).
257. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 62, at 264-65. Jeffrey Wigand, who leaked data from Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Company, is an example of this kind of informant.
258. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, ioo4-o5, ioi6 (1984) (holding health
and safety data on fungicides to be trade secrets, although allowing the government to disclose them if
necessary to inform the public about risks).
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D. WHEN THIRD PARTY RECIPIENTS PROPOSE TO DISCLOSE NEWSWORTHY
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, COURTS SHOULD INVOKE THE HEAVY
PRESUMPTION AGAINST PRIOR RESTRAINTS
Most of the trade secret cases in which First Amendment defenses
have been successful have presented a common pattern: (i) a third party
journalist and/or news organization obtains non-public information from
a second party that it later learns a first party claims as a misappropriated
trade secret or confidential information; (2) the third party decides to
publish the information because it is newsworthy; (3) because the third
party is not bound by any contractual or confidential obligation to the
first party (although the second party may be) and did not act in concert
with the second party in any misappropriation of the secret, the third
party feels justified in publicly disclosing the information;'59 (4) the first
party then asserts that the third party knew or ought to have known the
information was a misappropriated trade secret that should not be or
should not have been made public and seeks a preliminary and/or
permanent injunction; (5) the journalist and/or news organization then
argues that the First Amendment privileges the disclosure.
In Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,' 6' for example,
Business Week (BW) obtained information pertinent to Procter &
Gamble's lawsuit against Bankers Trust (BT) from documents that had
been filed under seal. 6 ' Upon learning of BW's intent to publish a story
about it,' 6' lawyers for both parties immediately went to the trial court
requesting a temporary restraining order (TRO) to forbid BW from
publishing the information, alleging that it contained trade secrets from
documents filed under seal in the case, publication of which would cause
irreparable harm.' 63 The trial court granted the TRO.' 6' After a hearing to
determine the source of the leak, the court determined that BW had
knowingly violated the protective order and should therefore be
permanently barred from publishing the information.' 6' The trial court
259. See Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 63-66 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding
against liability for publication of bar association evaluation of a judicial candidate, even though
someone had disclosed his name to the newspapers in violation of law). The court found First
Amendment protection for ordinary newsgathering activities such as "asking persons questions,
including those with confidential or restricted information." Id. The court ruled that conclusory
allegations of conspiracy with wrongdoer "cannot serve to transform privileged behavior of the media
defendants into tortious behavior." Id.
260. 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
261. Id. at 222-23.
262. Procter & Gamble learned of the impending publication when a BW reporter called to get
comments on the story it was about to print. See id. at 224.
263. Id. at 222-23.




March 2007] TRADE SECRETS AND THE FIRSTAMENDMENT
dismissed concerns about the First Amendment.' 66
The Sixth Circuit criticized the trial court for its insensitivity to First
Amendment considerations, noting that "'prohibiting the publication of
a news story... is the essence of censorship,' and is allowed only under
exceptional circumstances.' 267 The trial court "fail[ed] to conduct any
First Amendment inquiry before granting the two TROs" and
"compounded the harm by holding hearings on issues that bore no
relation to the right of Business Week to disseminate information in its
possession. '' "8 Instead of trying to determine the source of the leak, the
trial court should have focused on whether Procter & Gamble and BT
had shown exceptional circumstances that would justify a prior restraint
on publication.'69
In State ex rel. Sports Management News, Inc. v. Nachtgal,"' the
Oregon Supreme Court overturned a preliminary injunction forbidding
Sports Management News (SMN) to publish reports about a new shoe
design that Adidas claimed as a trade secret."' Adidas had only made
this trade secret information available to select employees who were
bound by confidentiality agreements not to reveal such information 2 It
was reasonable to infer that SMN knew that the information had been
disclosed in breach of confidence. Yet, the court characterized a lower
court order that SMN refrain from publishing any information derived
from Adidas proprietary information as a "classic prior restraint" and
overturned the lower court's order that SMIN submit to the court for its
approval any reports about Adidas products prior to publication.73
266. Id. at 225. In ruling that the First Amendment did not forbid the injunction, the trial court
relied on Seattle Times Co. v. Rinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1974), in which the Court upheld an order
forbidding public disclosure of newsworthy information obtained during discovery. The Sixth Circuit
pointed out that reliance on Seattle Times was "misplaced" because it concerned the rights of parties to
the litigation to disseminate (or not) information obtained under a protective order during discovery,
not the rights of third party journalists to publish this information. 78 F.3d at 225.
267. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345 (ist Cir.
1986)).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 225-26. The trial court had not even given BW notice of the hearings or an opportunity
to be heard about its First Amendment interests in publication, thereby depriving BW of its due
process as well as its First Amendment rights. Id. at 226-27. The Sixth Circuit also questioned the
adequacy of the court's supervision of discovery. Id. at 227. One judge dissented on the ground that
the matter was moot because Business Week had by then published the article. Id. at 229 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
270. 921 P.2d 1304 (Or. 1996).
271. Id. at 1308-Io. The Oregon Supreme Court overturned the lower court's order based on its
interpretation of the free speech clause of the Oregon Constitution; it did not consider whether it
would have reached the same result under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1307
n.6.
272. Id. at x3o6.
273. Id. at 1308.
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In a third such case, Ford Motor Co. v. Lane,274 the court denied
Ford's motion for a preliminary injunction forbidding Lane from posting
information on the Internet about unreleased new automobile designs
and other non-public information that Ford claimed as trade secrets. 5
Ford argued that Lane knew that Ford employees were obliged not to
leak secret information of this sort, therefore Lane knew the information
had been misappropriated, and hence, he should be secondarily liable for1 76
the misappropriation. Yet, because Lane did not have a contractual or
confidential relationship with Ford and did not himself misappropriate
the information, the court ruled that "Lane's alleged improper conduct
in obtaining the trade secrets are not grounds for issuing a prior
restraint. 277
Professor Epstein has criticized Ford as an example of First
Amendment exceptionalism 78 "As between the two immediate parties
to the dispute," says Epstein, "the full set of efficiency arguments opts
strongly for the protection of trade secrets, given their essential role in
modem industry. 2 79 Lane knew full well that the persons from whom he
got Ford's secrets had misappropriated them, and "[hie decided to
publish the trade secrets on his website to retaliate against Ford after a
dispute about Lane's right to attend certain Ford trade shows and to use
either the Ford trade name or its Blue Oval trademark on his website.
' 8o
The trial judge also was troubled about "whether Lane utilized the
power of the Internet to extort concessions or privileges from Ford, by
threatening to sell blueprints or other confidential documents.
' '
,8,
Yet, it cuts in Lane's favor that he had been providing news about
Ford and its designs on his website for some time, and still does."" Lane's
knowledge that the information he published had been divulged in
breach of a confidence or contract is not atypical of situations that news
organizations routinely face."3 As Professor Volokh has observed,
274. 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999). O'Grady v. Superior Court is factually similar to Ford,
in that O'Grady published on his website information about forthcoming Apple products that Apple
claimed as trade secrets, although Apple did not name O'Grady as a defendant. 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72,
80-82 (Ct. App. 20o6).
275. Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
276. Id. at 748. The same allegation was apparently made in Sports Management News, although
the Oregon Supreme Court did not expressly say so. See 921 P.2d at 13o5-06.
277. Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 753. The trial court in Ford relied heavily on Procter & Gamble and
the substantially higher threshold it set for preliminary injunctions against third party publishers of
trade secrets. Id. at 751-53.
278. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1035-46; see also Goldberg, supra note 8, at 271.
279. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1037.
280. Id.
281. Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
282. Id. at 747; see BlueOvalNews.com, http://www.blueovalnews.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
283. Mainstream news organizations, such as the Wall Street Journal, have sometimes been
threatened by trade secret litigation when they publish non-public information about companies. In
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"Leaks of confidential information are a staple of modern investigative
journalism and have helped break many important stories. ' '  Courts
should be "extremely wary" of deciding what news can and cannot be
published. S5
Nevertheless, I agree with Professor Epstein that courts should be
careful in trade secret cases not to make too much of the Supreme Court
prior restraint decisions," especially of the Supreme Court's decisions in
New York Times v. United States (the Pentagon Papers case)"7 or of
Bartnicki v. Vopper,288 which held that the First Amendment barred a suit
for damages against third party publishers of illegally intercepted
information."" Thus, it is well to consider what deference is due to the
Pentagon Papers and Bartnicki decisions in judging the appropriateness
of preliminary injunctions and other relief in trade secrecy cases.
i. NEW YORK TIMES V. UNITED STATES
The facts of the Pentagon Papers case are well-known, but worth
briefly restating. Daniel Ellsberg obtained access to a set of documents
analyzing the Vietnam War prepared for the U.S. Department of
Defense while working for the Rand Corporation."w Ellsberg
communicated with personnel at the New York Times and Washington
Post about the documents and arranged for copies of them to be
delivered to these newspapers."' The Times and the Post spent several
months analyzing the documents, and then began publishing excerpts in
their newspapers.29 ' The United States sought to enjoin further
one documented instance, Procter & Gamble persuaded Ohio law enforcement officials to undertake
a criminal investigation over leaked information. See Terry M. Dworkin & Elletta S. Callahan,
Employee Disclosures to the Media: When is a "Source" a "Sorcerer"?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
357, 358 (1993).
284. Volokh, supra note 8, at 741. Volokh would have courts apply strict scrutiny to third party
publisher cases. See id.
285. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 113-14 (Ct. App. 2006).
286. The classic Supreme Court prior restraint decisions other than New York Times Co. v. United
States include: Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (i931).
287. 403 U.S. 713 (97). Many trade secret and free speech cases cite to the Pentagon Papers case.
See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317-18 (994); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust
CO., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996); Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 751; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F.
Supp. 260, 263 (E.D. Va. 1995); Bunner II, 1I3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 351 (2001). The Sports Management
News decision was the only trade secret and free speech case that did not invoke the Pentagon Papers
case. Because the Oregon Supreme Court was analyzing the constitutionality of the injunction in that
case under the Oregon Constitution, it did not consider whether it would have reached the same result
by interpreting the First Amendment. State ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d
1304, 13o7 n.6 (Or. 1996).
288. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
289. Id. at 533-35.
29o. The documents consisted of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making
Process on Viet Nam Policy." Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 714.
291. See Floyd Abrams, The Pentagon Papers a Decade Later, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1981, § 6 at 22.
292. See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S at 760 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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publication of excerpts. The Supreme Court ruled, 6-3, that the
newspapers could continue publishing the Pentagon Papers over the
government's objection.'93
Each member of the Court wrote his own opinion."l Justices Black
and Douglas were convinced that the press must always be free to
publish news without prior restraint by the government.95 Justice
Brennan accepted that prior restraints were justifiable in an "extremely
narrow class of cases,"' but thought that the government's case against
the New York Times and Washington Post was "predicated upon
surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result." 97
Justices White and Stewart, in contrast, were persuaded that publishing
these reports would cause "substantial damage" to U.S. interests, but
believed that the government had not satisfied the "unusually heavy
justification" for a prior restraint, especially "in the absence of express
and appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior restraints
in circumstances such as these.""s Justice Marshall questioned whether
the inherent powers of the Executive Branch allowed it to invoke the
equity jurisdiction of the Court to obtain an order restraining publication
of the papers." He pointed out that Congress had enacted numerous
laws to punish those Who wrongfully disclosed secret information, yet
had refused to enact a law that would have given the Executive Branch
authority to proceed against the newspapers in situations such as this.3"
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan, in dissent, were
unsympathetic to the newspapers' pleas, in large part because the
publishers knew that the documents had been stolen when they obtained
them.3"' All three dissenters objected to the haste with which the case had
been brought before the Court, and thought that the government should
have had more of an opportunity to make its case.3 '
First Amendment exceptionalists perceive the Pentagon Papers case
293. Id. A three-paragraph per curiam decision preceded the nine opinions by the Justices. Id.
294. Among the six Justices who voted against a prior restraint, Justices Black and Douglas
concurred in one another's opinions, as did Justices White and Stewart as to their opinions. Id. at 714,
720, 727, 730 (Black, J., concurring; Douglas, J., concurring; Stewart, J., concurring; White, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun joined. Id. at 752 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 714-24 (Black, J., concurring). Holding that the publication of news can be enjoined,
Justice Black thought, "would make a shambles of the First Amendment." Id. at 715.
296. Id. at 726. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan would only have found such a restraint
justified when the nation was at war, and the proposed publication would obstruct the war effort, as by
publishing non-public details about the sailing dates of warships. Id. at 726-27.
297. Id. at 725-26.
298. Id. at 731-33 (White, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 741-43 (Marshall, J., concurring).
300. Id. at 743-47.
301. Id. at 749-51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 748-62 (Burger, C.J., Harlan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
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to present four salient characteristics: (I) the documents about to be
published had been misappropriated; (2) although publishers of the
documents had not participated in the initial wrongdoing, they knew that
the documents to be published had been wrongfully obtained;
(3) because of this, the publishers risked criminal and civil liability; and
(4) publication of the documents could damage important interests.3 3
Procter & Gamble Co., Sports Management News, and Ford parallel the
Pentagon Papers case in these respects. The exceptionalists argue that
the economic interests of trade secret owners are less fundamental than
the national security interests at stake in the Pentagon Papers case.3"4 "If
a threat to national security was insufficient to warrant a prior restraint
in New York Times Co. v. United States," said one court, "the threat to
plaintiff's copyrights and trade secrets is woefully inadequate."3 5
The Court's more recent First Amendment jurisprudence does not
suggest that the Court today would rule differently in a next Pentagon
Papers case. Yet, the Pentagon Papers case involved highly respected
traditional news publishers, deliberative exercises of editorial judgment,
news having a significant bearing on governmental decisions on matters
of considerable public concern, and governmental attempts to assert
censorial powers over the publication decisions of major newspapers.
None of the trade secret/First Amendment cases has presented a similar
confluence of peak First Amendment values. Yet, the trade secret cases
in which First Amendment defenses have succeeded have involved
journalists or news organizations who exercised some editorial judgment
in deciding whether to publish information that they had reason to know
had been misappropriated. It remains to be seen whether the courts will
treat ordinary persons with an Internet connection or a website as
eligible for the same First Amendment safe harbor from injunctive relief
as in the Pentagon Papers.3 6
Several Justices in the Pentagon Papers were willing to accept that
proof of grave and irreparable injury would justify a prior restraint. In
trade secret cases, sometimes proof of this sort will be available. Several
303. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 8, at 543-51.
304. See, e.g., Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (giving credence to
predictions that publication of the papers would result in "'the death of soldiers, the destruction of
alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation with our enemies, [and] the inability of our
diplomats to negotiate"' (quoting United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327, 1330 (D.C. Cir.
197 1) (Wilkey, J., dissenting))).
305. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 263 (E.D. Va. 1995); see also Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3 d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996); Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F.
Supp. 2d 745, 751 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
306. In O'Grady, the California Court of Appeal ducked the question whether bloggers should be
accorded the same degree of First Amendment protection as journalists and traditional publishers. 44
Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, IO3 n.21 (Ct. App. 2006). The court declined the "implicit invitation to embroil
ourselves in questions of what constitutes 'legitimate journalis[m]."' Id. at 1457 (alteration in original).
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Justices were also concerned with the lack of legislative authority for
enjoining the press from publishing non-public government documents.
Trade secret cases, by contrast, are typically brought under state statutes
that expressly authorize issuance of preliminary and permanent
injunctions, and preliminary injunctions are regularly granted in trade
secret cases.3°
Bartnicki v. Vopper3 8 increases my confidence that a majority of the
Court would regard as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech a
preliminary injunction against public disclosure of newsworthy secrets by
a third party publisher who received the information without fault, even
if it had reason to know the secrets had been misappropriated. Trade
secrecy interests are important, but they must be weighed against the
interests of a free press, among other societal interests. Third party
publishers will have weighed the considerable risks of civil and criminal
liability for misappropriation in deliberating about whether to publish.
Because third party publication of trade secrets will be detectable, those
who wrongfully publish trade secrets cannot expect that they will get off
scot-free.
2. BARTNICKI V. VOPPER
Bartnicki and Kane were union officials whose cell phone
conversation about a contentious labor struggle in Pennsylvania was
intercepted by an unknown person.3" Vopper, a radio commentator who
had previously been critical of the union, played a tape of the intercepted
conversation on a local radio station." ' The tape included talk of blowing
up the front porches of homes of the union's adversaries if the union
didn't get what it wanted.3 ' The substance of the tape was subsequently
republished by other local news media.12
Bartnicki and Kane sued Vopper and other media defendants for
violating federal wiretap law which makes it illegal to "intentionally
disclose[ ]... to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the [illegal] interception of a wire,
oral, or electronic communication." '313 They sought actual, statutory, and
punitive damages, as well as attorney fees."4 Through discovery,
Bartnicki learned that Vopper had obtained the tape from the head of a
307. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides that "[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation may
be enjoined." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619 (2005).
308. 532 U.S. 514 (2ooI).
309. Id. at 518-19.
310. Id. at 519.
311. Id. at 518-19.
312. Id. at 519.
313. 18 U.S.C. § 251I)(c) (2000).
314- Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 520.
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local taxpayers' organization, Jack Yocum, who claimed the tape had
been left anonymously in his mail box."5 The trial court rejected
Vopper's First Amendment defenses because it regarded the wiretap law
as a content-neutral law of general applicability that satisfied
intermediate scrutiny standards?' 6 The Court granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict among the circuits on First Amendment defenses in
wiretap cases, and reversed."7
The Court did not question that the interception was intentional or
that Vopper and his co-defendants had reason to know that the
interception was illegal. 3'5 The question was whether it was consistent
with the First Amendment to hold them liable for damages for disclosing
the illegally intercepted information."9 Justice Stevens, writing for a
plurality of the Court, distinguished Bartnicki from typical wiretap cases
on three grounds:
First, respondents played no part in the illegal interception. Rather,
they found out about the interception only after it occurred, and in fact
never learned the identity of the person or persons who made the
interception. Second, their access to the information on the tapes was
obtained lawfully, even though the information itself was intercepted
unlawfully by someone else. Third, the subject matter of the
conversation was a matter of public concern.32
The wiretap laws are content-neutral and their purpose -to protect
the privacy of communications -was unrelated to the suppression of
speech.32" ' Yet, the wiretap law's prohibition on third party disclosure "is
fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech," and "'[i]f the acts of
"disclosing" and "publishing" information do not constitute speech, it is
hard to imagine what does fall within that category.' 32 Justice Stevens
invoked several precedents upholding the right of the media to publish
315. Id. at 519.
316. Id. at52I.
317. Id. at 522. The cases in conflict were Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000),
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999), and Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 521-22.
318. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 524-25.
319. Id. at 525.
320. Id. (citation omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas would have
upheld the lower court and applied intermediate scrutiny in Bartnicki, under which
[t]hese laws are content neutral; they only regulate information that was illegally obtained;
they do not restrict republication of what is already in the public domain; they impose no
special burdens upon the media; they have a scienter requirement to provide fair warning;
and they promote privacy and free speech of those using cellular phones. It is hard to
imagine a more narrowly tailored prohibition on the disclosure of illegally intercepted
communications ....
Id. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent characterized the "matter of 'public concern"'
limitation as "an amorphous concept that the Court does not even attempt to define." Id. at 542.
321. Id. at 526 (plurality opinion).
322. Id. at 526-27 (alteration in original) (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 120 (3d Cir.
I999)).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:777
certain lawfully obtained truthful information despite knowledge of laws
forbidding its disclosure.323 The Bartnicki plurality observed that "'if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need... of the highest order."3 4
Justices Breyer and O'Connor concurred in the judgment, characterizing
the public interest in disclosure in Bartnicki as "unusually high" and the
speaker's privacy expectations as "unusually low" because of the threat
of potential violence.3"5
There were thus six Justices who believed that the First Amendment
shielded third party publishers of illegally obtained information from
damage lawsuits when the information disclosed was of public concern.
3. Implications
Had the question in Bartnicki been whether the First Amendment
would shield Vopper from a preliminary injunction against public
broadcast of the contents of the tape, the Court would almost certainly
have considered it an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. After
all, six Justices believed that the First Amendment immunized Vopper
from damages claims. Less clear, however, is whether the Court would
have made the issuance of a preliminary injunction turn on whether the
information about to be broadcast was a matter of public concern.326
323. Id. at 527-28 (citing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (no civil liability for publishing
the name of a rape victim); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (979) (striking down law
criminalizing publication of the name of a juvenile defendant); Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978) (striking down law criminalizing publication of information from confidential
proceedings of state judicial review committee)). Justice Stevens also invoked New York Times Co. v.
United States as a case in which "the Court upheld the right of the press to publish information of great
public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party." Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (citing 403
U.S. 713 (1971)). The dissent objected to the Court's reliance on these precedents, distinguishing the
first three cases from Bartnicki because the information there had already been publicly available and
the Court's concern was about press "'timidity and self-censorship."' Id. at 545-47 (Rehnquist C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535). In addition, the dissent found the Court's reliance
on New York Times "mystifying" given that it involved an attempted prior restraint on speech by the
government, not an action for damages. Id. at 555.
324. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 443 U.S. at 103).
325. Id. at 535, 540 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer gave examples of situations in which
disclosures of intercepted communications would not satisfy the public concern standard. Id. at 540.
326. None of the trade secret/First Amendment cases, for example, mentioned the public/private
concern distinction. It would be inconsistent with their rulings to impose such a requirement. But the
public/private concern distinction has had significance in cases involving damage awards. See, e.g., Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (holding that there was no First
Amendment impediment to award of damages against non-media defendant for issuing a credit report
falsely claiming that plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy, as it pertained to matters of private concern);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140-42 (1983) (public employee seeking damages for wrongful
termination after speaking out on matters the Court deemed to be of private concern); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 (974) (need for showing actual malice to justify award damages
for defamation as to issues of public concern to be consistent with the First Amendment). For further
discussion of damage issues, see infra Part V.A.
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Professor Volokh has argued that making the availability of
preliminary injunctions turn on whether the information about to be
disclosed is a matter of public or private concern would be highly
dangerous to a free press, for it calls for "a highly subjective judgment.
3 27
Judicial decisions based on this distinction will "simply reflect [the
courts'] judgments about who should win or lose in this case, rather than
more principled judgments about the actual value of the speech to the
public.328
Bunner illustrates the subjectivity of this distinction. Although the
California Supreme Court in Bunner III conceded that the secrets "may
have some link to a public issue," it characterized the CSS secrets as
matters of private concern because they "convey only technical
information about the method used by specific private entities to protect
their intellectual property" and because Bunner "did not post them to
comment on any public issue or to participate in any public debate." '329
Bunner III asserted that disclosure of CSS secrets "adds nothing to the
public debate over the use of encryption software or the DVD industry's
efforts to limit unauthorized copying of movies on DVD's [sic]. 33°
Bunner III, however, misconstrued the debate to which Bunner sought to
make a contribution.
A U.C. Berkeley computer scientist, whose declaration was offered
in support of Bunner's opposition to a preliminary injunction, explained
why access to information about encryption schemes, such as CSS, were
matters of public concern:
8. Publication of... flaws in supposedly secure systems serves a vital
public interest. As our society becomes increasingly dependent on
computers, telecommunications, and other information systems, it is
important that our critical shared infrastructure be trustworthy and
free of systemic security flaws. At the same time, as electronic
commerce becomes more prevalent, criminals gain an increasing
financial incentive to exploit security vulnerabilities in our critical
systems. The vulnerabilities I described above clearly illustrate that the
risks are very real: much of our existing infrastructure contains serious
security vulnerabilities in its design and implementation, even though
this fact may not have been apparent to the public.
io. Cryptography is one of the primary means of securing our critical
327. Volokh, supra note 8, at 747; see also id. at 743 ("Every time the Court has decided that
certain speech is not on a matter of public concern, it has erred.").
328. Id. at 747.
329. Bunner III, 75 P.3d 1, 15-16 (Cal. 2003) (emphasis omitted). Justice Brown pointed to dicta in
Bartnicki that listed trade secrets among the categories of information that are matters of private
concern. Id. at 15 (citing Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533). But as Professor Volokh has pointed out, some
trade secrets are matters of public concern. Volokh, supra note 8, at 747-48.
330. Banner 111, 75 P.3d at 16.
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information infrastructure against attack, and the study of
cryptography must, I believe, form an essential foundation for our
future information infrastructure. I believe that it is the scientific
community's duty to study these issues and to report on systemic risks
that the public at large may not be aware of. One must understand the
risks in order to prevent them from recurring.
12. Publication and circulation of results is the accepted way to share
ideas and advance scientific knowledge about cryptography. It is
widely held that the only way to learn how to build secure systems is to
be intimately aware of the techniques a typical attacker might use: to
be a good codemaker, one must be an accomplished code breaker.
Moreover, it is not enough merely to study the theory of code-
breaking: it is crucial to understand how real-world security measures
are broken in practice, if we wish to build and deploy real security
systems. 3 '
Scholarly works have, in fact, been published on CSS that would
have been impossible if CSS stayed secret.33
Bunner III has been rightly criticized for suggesting that technical
information is, by its nature, not of public concern. 3 The general public
may not be able to understand all of the fine details of encryption
technologies, nuclear power plant safety systems, or complex chemical
processes, but scientists who assess the implications of these technologies
for the security and safety of the public are engaged in discourse on
matters of public concern when they publish information about their
safety, security, and the like.
Although Bunner IV did not directly challenge Bunner III on the
private/public concern distinction, it made some observations that
undercut its private concern conclusion:
Well before DeCSS was released on the Internet, a number of people
had become interested in unraveling the CSS security system. Users of
the Linux computer operating system had organized a forum dedicated
to finding a way to override CSS. Apparently DVD CCA had not
licensed CSS to anyone making DVD drives for the Linux system, so
that computers using Linux were incapable of playing DVD's [sic].
CSS was widely analyzed and discussed in the academic cryptography
community .... As early as July 1999 comments on Slashdot revealed
a worldwide interest in cracking CSS."
The Court of Appeal, unlike the California Supreme Court, paid
attention to reasons that Bunner gave for posting DeCSS on his website.
Bunner believed DeCSS would contribute to making DVDs Linux-
331. Declaration of David Wagner, Bunner I, No. CV7 86804 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. I4, 2000),
available at http://www.eff.orglIPIVideo/DVDCCA-case/2ooooio7-pi-motion-wagnerdec.html.
332. See, e.g., Eaton-Salners, supra note Ioi, at 284; Touretsky, supra note 94.
333. Eaton-Salners, supra note ioi, at 282-83; Volokh, supra note 8, at 746-47.
334. Bunner IV, to Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 189 (Ct. App. 2004) (footnote omitted).
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compatible, and this would make the Linux platform more attractive to
consumers and more competitive with Microsoft's platforms.335 Providing
source code of DeCSS to the Linux community was, Bunner believed,
''an important and effective way to ensure programmers would have
access to the information needed to add new features, fix existing defects,
and in general, improve the 'deCSS' program. ' ,336 Other posters of
DeCSS may well have been protesting DVD CCA's effort to protect CSS
through multiple layers of license restrictions on reverse engineering.337
The competitiveness of the Linux platform is obviously not as much
a matter of public concern as, say, the war in Iraq. Yet, the U.S. Justice
Department brought suit against Microsoft in the 1990s in part to
challenge some of its technical design decisions and other practices as
anti-competitive as to firms that threatened Microsoft's dominance in the
operating system market."' European authorities similarly charged
Microsoft with abuse of its dominant position for its effort to control
compatible technologies, including the RealNetworks media player
software.339 European authorities also recently came to the United States
to investigate whether rival makers of DVD technologies have unduly
pressured motion picture studios to adopt one of two rival standards.4
The California Court of Appeal recently gave a spirited explanation of
the significance of news about an upcoming Apple Computer product
whose publication Apple sought to suppress as a stolen trade secret."'
Bunner III's characterization of CSS secrets as private matters thus
seems more a reflection of who Justice Brown thought should win the
case than a well-reasoned analysis of the issue.
When ruling on a First Amendment defense in trade secret cases,
courts may wish to consider whether the information about to be
disclosed is newsworthy or of public concern. First Amendment interests
of speakers are strongest when information meets one of these criteria.
Yet, courts should recognize that "peril [is] posed to First Amendment
values when courts or other authorities assume the power to declare
335. See Declaration of Andrew Bunner at 1 6-8, Bunner I, No. CV786804 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan.
14, 2000), available at http://www.eff.org/IPfVideofDVDCCA-case/20000io7-pi-motion-
bunnerdec.html [hereinafter Bunner Declaration].
336. Id. I io.
337. See Eaton-Salners, supra note tot, at 273, 283-84 (discussing protests related to DeCSS); see
also id. at 284 n.s io (discussing other public policy goals served by public disclosure of CSS).
338. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,47 (D.C. Cir. 200t).
339. See, e.g., Case COMP/C-3/37 .7 9 2, Comm'n v. Microsoft Corp., 2004 E.C. 299, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
340. See, e.g., James Kanter & Ken Belson, European Panel Investigates DVD-Standards Rivalry,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2oo6, at C3.
341. O'Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 114 (Ct. App. 2oo6) ("Apple's commitment to
such a product could prove to be an important step in democratizing the production and publication of
music.").
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what technological disclosures are newsworthy and what are not.""
Newsworthiness may not be the appropriate standard for judging
whether someone such as Bunner qualifies for a First Amendment
privilege to disseminate information that another claims as a trade
secret. 3 The focus should instead be on "'whether the person seeking to
invoke the [First Amendment] privilege' had 'the intent to use
material-sought, gathered or received-to disseminate information to
the public and [whether] such intent existed at the inception of the
newsgathering process."' 3  Under such a test, third party intellectual
property anarchists and vengeful former employees would not succeed
342. Id.
343. Bunner did not himself misappropriate CSS. See Bunner Declaration, supra note 335, 3, 7-
14. He got DeCSS from one of the many public postings of this program on the Internet. See id. He
denied knowing that DeCSS contained stolen trade secrets at the time of the initial posting, but he
certainly became aware that DVD CCA claimed DeCSS embodied stolen trade secrets when he was
sued for trade secret misappropriation. See id. Bunner republished DeCSS source code in order to
facilitate communication with members of the open source community who were interested in
developing an open source Linux-based DVD player. See id.
Even though Bartnicki obviously involves a very different legal claim than Bunner-violation
of federal wiretap laws rather than a violation of state trade secrecy law-there are many similarities
between the two cases. In both cases, liability was premised on public disclosure of illegally obtained
information that the plaintiffs wanted to remain private, not on the initial receipt and possession of it.
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514, 519 (2ooi); Bunner 111, 75 P.3d s, 7-9 (Cal. 2003). Defendants in both
cases were charged as secondary wrongdoers. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519; Bunner IV, so Cal. Rptr. 3 d
185, 188-89 (Ct. App. 2004). They were not the persons who illegally obtained the information in
dispute. Rather, they were persons remote in time and place from the allegedly illegal acts, and they
did not act in league with primary wrongdoers, nor aid or abet them. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519-2o;
Bunner I11, 75 P.3d at 7-9. Defendants in both cases denied that they knew or had reason to know that
the information they published resulted from another's wrongful act, although the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants should be held liable because they should have known the information was
illegally obtained. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519-2o; Bunner 111, 75 P.3d 1, 7-9.
In addition, the statutes in both Bunner and Bartnicki are content-neutral; yet, on the face of
both statutes, disclosure of even matters of public concern would be unlawful. In both cases, two
important conflicting interests had to be balanced. Holding Bunner and others liable for republishing
DeCSS source code will no more deter youngsters from reverse engineering encryption software in
violation of shrinkwrap licenses than holding Vopper liable for damages to Bartnicki would deter
illegal interceptions of cell phone conversations.
There are several reasons why Bunner is an even more plausible First Amendment case than
Barnicki. Most important is the fact that Bartnicki involved a claim for damages for a public
disclosure of private information, whereas the relief at issue in Bunner was a preliminary injunction.
See supra note 326 and accompanying text. It is, moreover, telling that DVD CCA did not seek
damages against Bunner or any of the other 520 co-defendants even though DVD CCA alleged that
Bunner's publication of DeCSS on the Internet was alleged to be certain to have profoundly
destructive effects on DVD CCA's licensing business. See Bunner 111, 75 P.3d at 6-8. DVD CCA
further alleged that the availability of DeCSS on the Internet would have profoundly destructive
effects on the motion picture industry, the computer industry, and the consumer electronics industry;
yet, no firm from these industries joined the lawsuit as a co-plaintiff seeking damages. Id. DVD CCA's
goal was to suppress the publication of DeCSS and any other CSS proprietary information, which is all
the more reason for courts to be concerned about this injunction as a prior restraint.
344. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9 th Cir. 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting von Bulow
v. von Bulow, 81 1 F.2d 136, 44 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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with First Amendment defenses for Internet posting of trade secrets,"
although those who disseminated the secrets to promote public
awareness and discourse might.
In sum, preliminary injunctions should not issue against public
disclosure of trade secrets when four factors are present: (I) the party is
being charged with secondary liability for trade secret misappropriation;
(2) he or she did not participate in the direct misappropriation and was
not in league with any direct misappropriator; (3) although he or she
received the information from the direct misappropriator and may know
or have reason to know that it was misappropriated, he or she intends to
disseminate the information as news; and (4) he or she does not intend to
appropriate the commercial value of the secret in a manner competitive
with the trade secret's developer.346
V. OTHER FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS IN TRADE SECRET CASES
The First Amendment has implications in trade secret cases not only
for issuance of preliminary injunctions, but also for a range of other
matters, such as whether trade secret disclosers can claim immunity from
damage claims, whether trade secret claimants can obtain discovery of
communications between third party publishers and those who disclosed
trade secret information to them, and how much deference appellate
courts should give to trial court findings when First Amendment defenses
are raised in trade secret cases, as well as in tailoring injunctive relief for
misappropriation.
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT MAY REQUIRE LIMITS ON DAMAGE AWARDS IN
SOME TRADE SECRETS CASES
Professors Lemley and Volokh have argued that third party
"publication of a trade secret by a party who isn't bound by the contract
might be constitutionally protected even against a damages judgment.""
345. See United States v. Genovese, 4o9 F. Supp. 2d 253, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting First
Amendment defense to Economic Espionage Act (EEA) prosecution for trade secret
misappropriation for posting Microsoft source code on the Internet and charging a fee for sharing it
with others); see also Press Release, Microsoft, Statement from Microsoft Regarding Illegal Posting of
Windows 2000 Source Code (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2oo4/febo4/o2-
12windowssource.mspx (announcing illegal postings of Windows source code).
346. There is some risk that this standard would facilitate the "laundering" of misappropriated
information. That is, X may be more inclined to misappropriate information and pass it to Y if Y
cannot be enjoined or even held liable in damages for publishing the information, even if Y knew or
had reason to know it was misappropriated. As long as X can find a way to pass the information along
anonymously, both X and Y may avoid liability and the trade secret developer will be left without a
remedy. Yet, in cases like this, courts would likely consider X and Y to be in league as direct
misappropriators. The Court rejected a similar line of reasoning in Bartnicki. See 532 U.S. at 529-31. If
courts require the information to be newsworthy and there is a risk of civil or criminal liability for
wrongfully publishing trade secrets, the laundering risk should be minimal.
347. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 230.
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This may, however, misstate the law and, perhaps, good policy.
Of course, the First Amendment immunity from damage awards in
Bartnicki is consistent with other notable cases involving public
disclosure of misappropriated information. In Pearson v. Dodd, for
example, the D.C. Circuit affirmed a trial court decision that two
newspaper columnists were not liable for violating Senator Dodd's
privacy when they published information regarding alleged misdeeds
discerned from documents that former employees had misappropriated
from Dodd's office.-8 Pearson is consistent with Bartnicki, which also
involved media defendants and matters of public concern.349
Despite Professor Volokh's misgivings about the subjectivity of the
public/private concern distinction,"O courts are likely to look to decisions
such as Bartnicki in deciding that third party publishers of trade secrets
should only be immunized from damages liability if the secrets disclosed
pertain to matters of public concern. Too broad an immunity from
damages liability may give third party publishers too little incentive to
think twice about whether to reveal information that they know or have
348. 41o F. 2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, the columnists, were aware
that the documents had been purloined. Id. at 705. The D.C. Circuit also reversed the trial court's
ruling that the columnists were liable for conversion of the documents on the ground that the
columnists had received copies of the documents, not the originals which were returned to Dodd's
office. Id. at 708. Boehner v. McDermott, another D.C. Circuit decision, is arguably in conflict with
Pearson. 441 F.3d liO0 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In its first Boehner decision, Boehner v. McDermott, the D.C.
Circuit rejected Congressman McDermott's First Amendment defense to a claim for damages arising
from wiretap charges for McDermott's public disclosure of the contents of a cellphone conversation
that he received from the private citizens who intercepted it. 191 F.3d 463, 475-78 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In
the call, Bochner and other Republican leaders discussed ethics violation charges against Newt
Gingrich and whether Gingrich should accept a reprimand without a hearing being held on the
charges. Id. at 465. The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and remanded Boehner for further
consideration in light of Bartnicki. Boehner v. McDermott, 532 U.S. 1050 (2001). On remand,
McDermott was ordered to pay $6o,ooo in damages and more than half a million dollars in attorney
fees. See Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d IOO, ioli (D.C. Cir. 20o6). The D.C. Circuit, with a 2-1
split, affirmed. Id. at 1017. Judge Sentelle dissented on the ground that the ruling was inconsistent with
Bartnicki:
Under the rule proposed by Representative Boehner, no one in the United States could
communicate on this topic of public interest because of the defect in the chain of title. I do
not believe the First Amendment permits this interdiction of public information either at
the stage of the newspaper-reading public, of the newspaper-publishing communicators, or
at the stage of Representative McDermott's disclosure to the news media.
Id. at 1022 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The D.C. Circuit has agreed to rehear the case en banc. Boehner
v. McDermott, No. 04-7203 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 20o6).
349. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (holding that First Amendment shielded
newspaper from liability for damages for publishing the name of a crime victim in violation of a law
protecting the anonymity interests of crime victims because the newspaper obtained the name from a
police bulletin board that negligently revealed the name); Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, 194 F.3 d
505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of fraud and unfair trade practices claims against ABC for
assigning agents to become employees of a food handling firm in order to obtain information about its
practices for a news story, but allowing claim for damages for breach of employees' duty of loyalty to
proceed). But see Epstein, supra note 8, at IOI8-23 (criticizing Desnick and Food Lion).
350. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
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reason to know are claimed as trade secrets. This may be an especially
important factor insofar as disclosers of trade secrets are non-media third
parties, such as Bunner.
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, for example, the
Court rejected a First Amendment defense to damages liability as to
non-media defendants.35' Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) had sent a credit
report to five customers stating that Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy
and had very few assets.352 Greenmoss sued D&B for defamation,
alleging that this false report had damaged its reputation; a jury returned
a verdict in Greenmoss's favor and awarded compensatory and punitive
damages.353 Because it had no actual malice against Greenmoss, D&B
claimed that the First Amendment should shield it from liability. 4 A
majority of the Court disagreed, characterizing D&B as a non-media
defendant whose credit reports on Greenmoss's financial situation
involved a matter of private rather than public concern.3 5
Bunner III seems to suggest that trade secrets are always matters of
private concern and that this is another reason that the First Amendment
has little or no application in trade secret cases. Justice Brown viewed
the Court as having "expressly declined to extend Bartnicki to
'disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of
purely private concern.'"356  She interpreted this declination as
"recogniz[ing] that the First Amendment interests served by the
disclosure of purely private information like trade secrets are not as
significant as the interests served by the disclosure of information
concerning a matter of public importance. 357
This misconstrues Bartnicki, which simply found it unnecessary to
decide what implications the First Amendment might have for third
party disclosures of private matters. Bartnicki should not be understood
to say that trade secrets are, by their nature, only of private concern.
Justice Breyer's concurrence recognized that the law had long recognized
a privilege to disclose trade secrets when substantial public interests were
351. 472 U.S. 749,763 (i985).
352. Id. at 75.
353. Id. at 752.
354. Id. Dun & Bradstreet relied on Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 48 U.S. 323, 334 (974) (showing
of actual malice necessary to justify award damages for defamation). The Court ruled that the Gertz
actual malice standard only applied when the defamation pertained to matters of public concern. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 76o.
355. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 757-61.
356. Bunner 111, 75 P.3d 1, 15 (Cal. 2003) (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,533 (2OOI)).
357. Id. Volokh is critical of Barinicki for its characterization of trade secrets as matters of private
concern, noting that "[i]t would be a shame if the Court's casual, offhanded dictum led lower courts to
quickly uphold the ban on third-party publication of trade secrets based on an unsupported assertion
about their inherent 'private concern' status." Volokh, supra note 8, at 743.
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at stake.358 Viewed in this light, Bartnicki arguably supports a role for the
First Amendment in shielding those who disclose trade secrets of public
concern (e.g., toxic ingredients in a chemical product) from damage
awards.359
B. FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN TRADE
SECRET CLAIMANTS LITIGATE TO DISCOVER THE SOURCE OF LEAKED
TRADE SECRET INFORMATION
While the trade secret/First Amendment case law has thus far
focused mainly on whether third party publishers of secrets can be
constitutionally enjoined from disclosing them, the identity of the
person(s) from whom the publishers obtained the secrets will also be of
interest to the trade secret's developer. Courts have only recently
considered the First Amendment implications of a trade secret claimant's
efforts to get discovery from a publisher who wants to protect its sources.
In O'Grady v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal ruled
that a journalist's interests in protecting his sources outweighed a trade
secret claimant's interests in obtaining information about and from the
source in discovery, mainly because the trade secret claimant had not
exhausted efforts to obtain this information by other means. 36° The
litigation arose after Jason O'Grady published a series of articles on his
eponymous "Power Page" website about a multimedia product (named
Asteroid) under development at Apple Computer. 6' Apple sent
O'Grady a cease and desist letter, claiming that the nonpublic
information about product development he had posted was a valuable
trade secret and directing him to take down this information.362 Apple
believed that O'Grady had reason to know the information was a trade
secret because much of it came from a slide deck marked "Apple Need-
to-Know Confidential.
363
Apple then brought a trade secret misappropriation suit against a set
of "Doe" defendants. 364 It also obtained a subpoena to require O'Grady's
email service provider to hand over all communications between
358. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1993)).
359. Yet, the Court in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. ruled that the First Amendment permits
damage awards to persons harmed by the breach of a promise not to disclose newsworthy secret
information. 5o U.S. 663, 668-72 (i991). The Court did so without regard to the public/private
concern distinction. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
36o. 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (Ct. App. 2o06). Exhaustion of alternative sources was a factor in the
balancing test. Id. at 1o9-13.
361. Id. at 77-78.
362. Id. at 8o.
363. Id. at 79.
364. Id. at 8o. Apple implied that O'Grady might be a misappropriator but did not name him as a
defendant. Id.
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O'Grady and other persons pertinent to the Asteroid product.6 ' When
O'Grady learned of the subpoena, he moved for a protective order
against the disclosure of this data.366 The trial court denied this motion
because "the publishers had involved themselves in the unlawful
misappropriation. '' 0 The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court
should have issued the protective order, relying principally on a First
Amendment-based privilege in journalists to protect the identity of their
sources.
368
A threshold question was whether O'Grady qualified for the
conditional privilege arising from the constitutional commitment to a
free press:
The gist of the privilege is that a newsgatherer cannot to [sic] be
compelled to divulge the identities of confidential sources without a
showing of need sufficient to overbalance the inhibitory effect of such
disclosure upon the free flow of ideas and information which is the
core object of our guarantees of free speech and press.36
The Court of Appeal concluded that there was "no sustainable basis to
distinguish [O'Grady] from the reporters, editors, and publishers who
provide news to the public through traditional print and broadcast
media."37'
It then applied a five-factor balancing test for deciding whether to
require disclosure of source information37" ' that the California Supreme
Court had announced in Mitchell v. Superior Court.372 The court
considered, first, the nature of, and the journalist's role in, the litigation
at hand.373 The court found significant that O'Grady was not a defendant
in the litigation.374 While Apple implied that he might be among the
misappropriators of its secrets, this contention was, in the court's view,
"worse than speculative; it contradicts Apple's own allegations that the
Doe defendants are persons unknown to Apple," adding that it would be
a "gross impropriety [to use] the courts and their powers of compulsory
365. Id. at 8o-81.
366. Id. at 81.
367. Id. at 76.
368. Id. at 82-Hi6 (also ruling that disclosure would violate the Stored Communications Act, i8
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2ooo), and the California reporter "shield" law).
369. Id. at 105.
370. Id. at io6. An amicus brief asserted that bloggers had equally strong claims to be treated as
traditional journalists. Id. at 103 n.21. The court did not find it necessary to decide this question,
although it did distinguish O'Grady's regular publication from blogging. Id.
371. Id. at io6-o8.
372. See 690 P.2d 625, 631-34 (Cal. 1984). Mitchell was a libel action in which the California
Supreme Court ruled that reporters, editors, and publishers had a conditional privilege not to disclose
confidential sources and unpublished information provided by the sources; it set forth factors to be
weighed in determining whether the privilege should shield the disclosure. Id. at 629-34.
373. O'Grady, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at IO6-7.
374. Id. at lo7.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
process as a tool and adjunct of an employer's personnel department." '375
Second, the court considered the cruciality of the information. The
identity of the trade secret misappropriator "goes to the heart of its
claim," yet this was offset somewhat "by the possibility that Apple might
not identify the putative malefactor even if it obtains the discovery it
seeks."" 6
Third, the court considered whether the trade secret claimant had
shown exhaustion of alternative sources to get the information sought
from the journalist.377 Mitchell, the court noted, regarded, "[c]ompulsory
disclosure of sources as the last resort. ' ' ... Although Apple had
interviewed employees in investigating the source of the leak, it had not
interviewed them under oath.3 79 Genentech's amicus curiae-brief argued
that employers in Apple's situation "should be excused from
'conduct[ing] a needlessly disruptive and demoralizing internal
investigation whenever it detects a theft of trade secrets.""" The Court of
Appeal was unpersuaded that courts should "relieve the employer of this
dilemma by shifting its burdens onto third party journalists" because it
would "impair interests of constitutional magnitude."' 8'
Fourth, it considered the importance of maintaining confidentiality
of the information.382 Apple asserted that there was no public interest in
knowing the trade secrets. 8 ' The Court of Appeal disagreed with this
assertion both as a "categorical proposition" and as applied to O'Grady's
publication.384 "This case involves not a purely private theft of secrets for
venal advantage, but a journalistic disclosure to... an interested
public."'38
Finally, the court considered whether Apple had pleaded a prima
facie case of trade secret misappropriation. 386 "Here it can be reasonably
inferred from the circumstances shown by Apple that someone violated a
duty not to disclose the information in question, and that the information
constituted a trade secret. ' ' 387 Even though the second and fifth factors
weighed in Apple's favor, the court concluded that Apple had not made
375. Id. at io7-o8.
376. Id. at io8. The information could, for instance, have been sent to O'Grady anonymously. Id.
377. Id. at to9.
378. Id. (quoting Mitchell, 690 P.2d at 633-34).
379. Id. at to9.
380. Id. at hio.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 112.
383. Id.
384. Id. (questioning the categorical proposition); id. at 114 (explaining why Asteroid was not only
newsworthy but a matter of public concern).
385. Id. at 112-13.
386. Id. at' 15.
387. Id.
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a strong enough showing to obtain discovery of confidential source
information. 388
The Mitchell factors will obviously play out differently in varying
factual contexts, but they provide a sound mechanism for balancing the
First Amendment interests of journalists and publishers and those of
trade secret claimants in weighing whether confidential source
information should be disclosed to trade secret claimants.
C. A HIGH PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS AND OF IRREPARABLE INJURY SHOULD
BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS TO STOP
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION SECRETS IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE
No consensus exists about the standard of proof that plaintiffs in
informational trade secrecy cases should meet in order to qualify for
preliminary injunctive relief. At least three standards have been used or
proposed: (i) use of the generally applicable standard for preliminary
injunctions, that is, proof of a reasonable probability of success on the
merits and a balance of harms to the parties that tips in favor of the
plaintiff'8g; (2) a somewhat heightened standard when defendants claim
First Amendment rights to disclose informational trade secrets3"; and (3)
a rigorous four-part standard for all informational trade secrecy
preliminary injunctions." '
First Amendment advocate David Greene proposed the rigorous
four-part standard for issuance of preliminary injunctions in trade
secrecy cases that would: (I) impose a heavy presumption against the
issuance of the injunction as a prior restraint, (2) require proof of serious
irreparable harm to the trade secret owner, (3) require proof of harm
beyond the claimant's economic interests in the secrets to counterbalance
the constitutional interests at stake, and (4) recognize that the public
interest favors enforcement of civil liberties.392
Greene's proposed standard is, however, unnecessarily severe,
especially in ordinary trade secret cases. Use of the generally applicable
standard for preliminary injunctions against the use or disclosure of trade
secrets is unproblematic, from a First Amendment standpoint, when the
trade secrets are not being used or disclosed to contribute to public
discourse, but are or have been misappropriated for private use or
disclosure for purposes of commercial exploitation to the plaintiff's
detriment.
388. Id.
389. See, e.g., Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 158-65 (discussing the general standard). Courts
sometimes also consider various other factors in determining whether to issue injunctions in trade
secret cases. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44(2) (1993).
390. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 51o U.S. 1315, 130 (1994).
391. Greene, supra note 8, at 553-54.
392. Id. at 553-55.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
In the rare cases in which plaintiffs in trade secret cases seek a
preliminary injunction to prevent public disclosures of informational
secrets, courts should require a greater showing of probability of success
on the merits (i.e., a high probability of success) and a showing that grave
and irreparable harm to the trade secret claimant will result from such
disclosure. CBS and Procter & Gamble endorse such a heightened
standard of proof to justify preliminary injunctions in such
circumstances.393 As Justice Blackmun observed in CBS, preliminary
injunctions should not issue against public disclosure of trade secret
cases, unless "the evil that would result from the [disclosure] is both
great and certain and cannot be militated by less intrusive measures.""
This is consistent with other decisions by the Supreme Court requiring
heightened procedural and substantive standards when the law imposes
prior restraints on publication.395
Greene is right that the economic interests of trade secret owners
should not be given undue weight in cases raising First Amendment
defenses and that free speech interests should be part of the balance of
harms. But by insisting that there must be proof of harm to interests
more fundamental than the constitutional interests in free speech, he
underestimates the social interest in adequate protection of trade secrets.
If the First Amendment cuts too broad a swath through trade secrecy
law, it is not just the immediate economic harm to a trade secret claimant
that is at stake, but societal interests in adequate incentives to invest in
innovation, maintaining reasonable standards of commercial ethics,
willingness to license secrets to others, and costs attributable to greater
security measures.396 These interests are of a constitutional dimension as
well.3"
As long as trade secret claimants are required to show a high
probability of success on the merits and irreparable injury that
counterbalances harms to free speech interests, First Amendment values
should be adequately protected in those rare cases where trade secret
and First Amendment interests are in conflict."'
393. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
394. CBS, Inc., 510 U.S. at 1317.
395. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (clear and convincing evidence
needed in public figure libel cases); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 215-16 (arguing that
heightened standards of proof should be required in prior restraint cases).
396. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-87 (1974) (discussing the socially
harmful consequences that would flow from ruling that trade secret law was preempted by federal
patent law, a result whose consequences resemble those of not enjoining disclosure of trade secrets on
First Amendment grounds).
397. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
398. But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1257-58 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (applying generally applicable standard, but finding against a likelihood of
success on the merits in case involving republication of secrets on the Internet by non-
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D. APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD CONDUCT DE Novo REVIEW WHEN FIRST
AMENDMENT INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE IN TRADE SECRET CASES
Bunner III holds that appellate courts should undertake a de novo
review of the relevant constitutional facts when defendants raise First
Amendment defenses to trade secret misappropriation claims.3
Deferential review of a trial court's findings of fact pertinent to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction may be appropriate in an ordinary
trade secret case, but such deference is not warranted when free speech
and press interests are at stake." If the de novo examination leads the
appellate court to conclude that the injunction was "improper under
California's trade secret law, then it should find that the trial court
abused its discretion."40' The California Supreme Court traced this free
speech due process principle to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc.4"2 Although Bose was a trade
libel case, its endorsement of independent appellate review has been
applied in a wide array of cases implicating free speech/press interests.'
Conducting independent appellate review of constitutional facts in
such cases serves two purposes: to "prevent[ ] prejudiced or erroneous
deprivation of constitutional rights by fact finders" and "to help prevent
future mistakes by making the lines in free speech law clearer and more
administrable."'4 4 The Bunner case illustrates the importance of such
reviews.
The California Supreme Court in Bunner III directed the Court of
misappropriating third party who raised First Amendment defense).
399. Bunner III, 75 P.3d 1, 20 (Cal. 2003). Justices Werdegar and Moreno agreed about the need
for appellate courts to undertake an independent review of the record to ensure that the "factual
predicates for injunctive relief truly exist." Id. at 20-21 (Werdegar & Moreno, JJ., concurring).
400. Another aspect of First Amendment due process that should be followed in trade secrecy
cases where preliminary injunctions implicate First Amendment rights is expeditious appellate review.
More than four years passed between the trial court's issuance of preliminary injunction against
Bunner's posting of DeCSS on the Internet and the reversal of the preliminary injunction by the Court
of Appeal. Given that the injunction was erroneously granted, it seems unjust that Bunner had to wait
such a long time to be vindicated. See, e.g., Lemley & Volokh, supra note 8, at 179-8o (stressing
importance of prompt appellate review of preliminary injunctions against publication).
401. Bunner 111, 75 P.3d at 20.
402. Id. (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (0984)) (holding that
to comport with the First Amendment, appellate courts should undertake independent review of
constitutionally relevant facts pertinent to a trade libel allegedly committed by Consumer Reports as
to Bose products). The California Supreme Court did not use the term "First Amendment due
process," but the term is a useful way of understanding the nature of this principle. See Henry P.
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV. L. REv. 5 18 (1970).
403. Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in
Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2437 (1998); id. at 2432 ("As courts see more cases of a particular
type, they refine the line between protected speech (such as non-obscene art, innocent error, or
copying of ideas) and unprotected speech (such as obscenity, punishable libel, or copying of
expression).").
404- Id. at 2432.
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Appeal to conduct an independent review of the factual findings
underlying the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against
Bunner's posting of DeCSS source code.' 5 On remand, the Court of
Appeal found that "DVD CCA presented no evidence as to when
Bunner first posted DeCSS and no evidence to support the inference that
the CSS technology was still a secret when he did so." '  There was,
moreover, "a great deal of evidence to show that by the time DVD CCA
sought the preliminary injunction prohibiting disclosure of the DeCSS
program, DeCSS had been so widely distributed that the CSS technology
may have lost its trade secret status."4' The trial court had thus abused
its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction which "burden[ed]
more speech than necessary to protect DVD CCA's property interest
and was an unlawful prior restraint upon Bunner's right to free
speech...4.8
Both purposes of independent review were served in Bunner, for the
preliminary injunction against posting of DeCSS on trade secrecy
grounds had been erroneously granted on insufficient facts, and future
courts might have construed Bunner as substantially stretching California
trade secrecy law beyond its traditional bounds had the trial court's
findings not been closely scrutinized by the appellate court.4" Trial courts
in future cases may be more likely to be more careful with fact-finding in
similar cases because the Court of Appeal so forcefully explained
deficiencies in the factual record and why the preliminary injunction
should not have issued.
E. INJUNCTIONS IN INFORMATIONAL TRADE SECRET CASES SHOULD
INCLUDE STANDARD LIMITATIONS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH FIRST
AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
Trade secret injunctions, whether preliminary or permanent, often
provide that if the protected information becomes public or commonly
known in an industry by means other than wrongful acts of the
defendant, he or she will then be free to disclose the secrets as well.4 '°
Some injunctions, however, do not contain this limitation."'I A trade
405. Bunner 111, 75 P.3d at 20.
406. Bunner IV, to Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 196 (Ct. App. 2004).
4o7. Id.
4o8. Id.; accord Bunner 111, 75 P.3d at 24 (Moreno, J., concurring) ("The majority recognizes that a
preliminary injunction against the disclosure of an alleged trade secret without sufficient evidentiary
support is an unlawful prior restraint.").
409. The Court of Appeal in Bunner IV did not mention the preliminary or permanent injunction
against posting of DeCSS in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001), let
alone its view on the consistency of either injunction with First Amendment principles. See supra note
94 for a distinction between the injunctions in Bunner and Corley.
410. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bircon Corp., 416 U.S. 270,474 (1974).
4t1. See, e.g., Bunner I, No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 21, 2000)
(preliminary injunction lacked a limiting provision about Bunner's right to disclose CSS secrets
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secrecy injunction that fails to include such a limitation will stifle the free
flow of information without adequate justification.4 1' To be consistent
with First Amendment principles, trade secrecy injunctions ought to
include provisions allowing the defendants to disclose previously secret
information if it has become public or commonly known in an industry. 13
To the extent they do not so provide, courts reviewing such injunctions
ought to read such a limiting term into the order to comport with First
Amendment principles.
The Restatement of Unfair Competition opines:
If the public disclosure results from the defendant's own unauthorized
conduct, injunctive relief may remain appropriate until the information
would have become readily ascertainable to the defendant through
proper means. However, if the defendant's disclosure results in
extensive use of the information by others, a continuing injunction may
yield little benefit to the plaintiff.4"4
Injunctions against use or disclosure of informational trade secrets
should also generally be limited in duration. Forbidding the use or
disclosure of misappropriated information for a period that approximates
the time it would have taken the defendant to reverse engineer or
otherwise obtain the information by proper means is reasonable given
that trade secrecy law aims to provide reasonable lead time to
innovators, not to give them perpetual exclusive property rights in the
secrets."5 Consistent with this principle, courts typically enjoin use or
disclosure of protected secrets for a reasonable period of time, such as
the amount of time it would take another person or firm to obtain the
secret by reverse engineering' 6 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition endorses such limitations on trade secret injunctions."7 Yet,
not all trade secrecy injunctions are so limited.' It is difficult to justify
revealed in DeCSS if this information became public).
412. See, e.g., Conmar Prod. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 156-57 (2d Cir.
1949) (injunction unavailable once trade secrets have been disclosed in a patent).
413. See, e.g., Bridge C.A.T. Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 71o F.2d 940, 945-47 (2d Cir. 1983)
(overturning order forbidding disclosure of information claimed as trade secret, but gathered by the
plaintiff from independent sources on grounds that plaintiff had First Amendment rights to disclose
this information and that court order was unjustifiable as a prior restraint).
414. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 cmt. f (1993).
415. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2438-39 (I994) (discussing the lead time functions of trade secrecy law).
416. See, e.g., Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1983) (enjoining
misappropriator for time necessary to obtain information by proper means).
417. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 cmt. f (1993) ("[Ilnjunctive relief
should ordinarily continue only until the defendant could have acquired the information by proper
means.... More extensive injunctive relief undermines the public interest by restraining legitimate
competition.").
418. See, e.g., Bunner I, No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512, at *3 (Super. Ct. Cal. Jan. 21, 2000).
Judge Elfving did not explain his reasons for the unlimited duration of the injunction. Perhaps he
accepted DVD CCA's contention that reverse engineering of CSS could not be done lawfully any
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on First Amendment as well as trade secrecy policy grounds an
injunction that forbids use or disclosure of the information in
perpetuity.4"9
Courts should also be wary of enjoining reverse engineering of trade
secrets. Because reverse engineering is an essential part of ongoing
innovation, even misappropriators should be able to reverse engineer
lawfully obtained products in order to obtain access to the protected
secret and other information during the term of the injunction, or at least
to establish a "clean room" to conduct reverse engineering to obtain the
secrets in a lawful manner, including ones he or she previously
misappropriated.42° If the subject matter being reverse engineered is
computer program code, a reverse engineer arguably has a First
Amendment right to reverse-analyze the code,42' at least in the absence
of a valid contractual restriction on reverse engineering, 2 and to make
use of that information or disclose it.
Reverse engineers will generally be disinclined to publicly disclose
information they have acquired through reverse engineering. Because
reverse engineering requires expenditure of considerable time, money,
and energy, the reverse engineer will typically want to maintain the
acquired information as its own trade secret. If the reverse engineer
wishes to privately license what it learned from the reverse engineering
process as a way of recouping its research and development expenses, it
is consistent with U.S. trade secrecy principles and arguably with First
Amendment principles as well to allow this.4"3 If the information was
where in the world because of the web of restrictive licensing agreements that DVD CCA and its
predecessors in interest had imposed on their licensees and those licensees imposed on others. But this
is highly contestable.
419. In rare circumstances, courts may believe the secret cannot be lawfully obtained by proper
means, but a court should have to justify any injunction lacking in durational limits or limiting use or
disclosure in excess of the estimated time it would take to acquire the secrets by proper means.
420. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (establishing clean
room established after former Computer Associates employee misappropriated Computer Associate's
code while working for Altai).
421. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of Stanford Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D.D.C. i99 I) ("[T]he
First Amendment protects scientific expression and debate just as it protects political and artistic
expression."); Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, r8 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 501, 504 (2003) (to protect scientific inquiry, DMCA anti-circumvention rules should be construed
narrowly).
422. See supra Part II.B concerning the enforceability of anti-reverse engineering clauses in license
agreements.
423. The European Union prohibits private and public disclosures of information obtained in the
course of decompilation of computer programs for purposes of achieving interoperability. See Council
Directive 91/250 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, art. 6(2), I991 O.J. (LI22) 42, 45.
This Directive puts at risk authors of books such as ANDREW SHULMAN ET AL., UNDOCUMENTED
WINDOWS: A PROGRAMMER'S GUIDE TO RESERVED MICROSOFr WINDOWS API FUNCrIONS (1992). This
aspect of the Directive could not be enforced in the United States consistent with the First
Amendment.
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lawfully reverse-engineered, the reverse engineer should also be free to
publish it as a matter of First Amendment as well as trade secrecy law.424
Finally, trade secret injunctions should be narrowly tailored so that
the termination of an unsuccessful collaboration does not result in
barring former collaborators from continuing to work in the field. In
Southwest Research Institute v. Keraplast Technologies, Ltd.,425 a
preliminary injunction unduly restricted the First Amendment interests
of researchers. Southwest Research Institute (SWRI) had performed
research and development work under contracts with Keraplast for ten
years.46 After a falling out between the firms over intellectual property
rights, SWRI undertook independent research projects in this field.427
Keraplast sued for trade secrecy misappropriation on the theory that "all
of the knowledge [SWRI] obtained is proprietary and confidential to
Keraplast. '42S The injunction forbade SWRI and its researchers from
conducting further research, publishing, and otherwise communicating
information related to the field of keratin-based technology.49 This
included, "without limitation, presentations, interviews, papers,
advertisements, electronic or written communication or business
inquiries."'43 The injunction also forbade SWRI from filing patent
applications in this field, initiating any tests or research to be performed
by third parties, and applying for research grants or submitting contract
research proposals to any private enterprise or government."43' The
Texas appellate court found the injunction to be impermissibly
overbroad, citing free speech considerations as a factor.432 Other courts
should follow the Texas appellate court's example in reviewing the
breadth of injunctions to ensure that they do not unduly encroach on
First Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
This Article has taken a middle ground between two extreme
positions. One such extreme is that trade secret claims are categorically
immune from First Amendment scrutiny because trade secrets are
"property" and enforcing these property rights is necessary to provide
adequate incentives to invest in innovation. The other extreme is that
preliminary injunctions against disclosures of trade secrets are
presumptively unconstitutional prior restraints on speech and should
424. See supra notes 25-30 (discussing Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 198i)).
425. 103 S.w.3d 478 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
426. Id. at 480.
427. Id. at 481.
428. Id. at 483.
429. Id. at 481.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 483.
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rarely if ever issue.
The middle ground recognizes that the First Amendment is not
generally implicated in trade secret cases. When defendants are under
contractual or other obligations not to disclose secrets to others, holding
them to their promises is generally consistent with the First Amendment.
When defendants have misappropriated information, preventing
disclosure of wrongfully acquired information is also generally consistent
with the First Amendment because private uses and disclosures of trade
secrets do not contribute in a meaningful way to public discourse.
But First Amendment defenses to trade secret claims should be
taken seriously when raised by those who did not participate in
misappropriating the information, who acquired the information
lawfully, and who seek to make public disclosures of newsworthy
information to contribute to public discourse. In exceptional cases,
preliminary injunctions may conflict with First Amendment rights, even
when defendants are in privity or have wrongfully acquired the
information, as long as the speaker also aims to disclose secrets in order
to promote public discourse. Preliminary injunctions that forbid public
disclosure of trade secrets when disclosure would promote such discourse
are prior restraints on speech that should bear a heavy presumption
against constitutionality.
While much of this Article's analysis focused on when to treat
preliminary injunctions in trade secret cases as prior restraints, it has
offered several other principles to mediate and mitigate the tensions that
occasionally arise between trade secrecy law and the First Amendment.
First, it identified some circumstances in which trade secret disclosers
should be immune from damage liability on First Amendment grounds.
Second, it endorsed use of a First Amendment-sensitive balancing test
for determining when to order third parties to disclose the identity of
second party misappropriators. Third, it showed why courts should
require heightened standards of proof when defendants raise appropriate
First Amendment defenses to preliminary injunctive relief in trade secret
cases. Fourth, it agreed with Bunner III that appellate courts should
conduct de novo appellate review of constitutionally relevant facts in
First Amendment-trade secret cases. Fifth, it argued that courts should
consider First Amendment values carefully when crafting the scope of
injunctive relief in trade secret misappropriation cases.
Finally, the Article explained why courts should be wary of efforts
by trade secret developers to stop "leaks" of trade secrets through use of
mass-market licenses and technological access controls to protect secrets
from discovery or disclosure. Courts should take First Amendment
principles and other public policy considerations into account when
deciding whether mass-market licenses or technical controls should
override traditional default rules of trade secrecy law, such as the right to
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reverse engineer a mass-marketed product.
Despite dire predictions of some commentators, trade secrets are
surviving the challenges of the Internet age. Courts are able to balance
the private interests of trade secret developers who cannot justify
investments in innovation if the law does not adequately protect them
and the public's interest in promoting the flow of information about
matters of public concern. Courts should take care to ensure that they do
not unwittingly rip trade secrecy law from its roots in unfair competition
principles in response to arguments that stronger protection for trade
secrets is necessary to protect incentives to invest in innovation.
Preserving confidential relationships, respecting contractual obligations,
and promoting fair competition should continue to be the mainstay of
trade secrecy law. Making trade secret law considerably stronger-
converting it, as some recommend, to a strong property right433 -will not
only distort free speech and free press principles, but undermine the
competition and innovation policies of intellectual property laws.
433. Richard Epstein, for example, asserts "[tihe entire edifice of property protection is
undermined" if people like Lane cannot be enjoined from posting information on his website which
Ford considers a trade secret. Epstein, supra note 8, at 1046. However, trade secrecy law is more
limited in its reach than Epstein is willing to admit. Trade secrecy law protects relationships and
protects against unfair means of acquiring someone's trade secrets. Lane did not violate a contractual
obligation to Ford of non-disclosure; he did not have a confidential relationship with Ford; and he did
not engage in wrongful acts such as bribery, fraud, or burglary in order to obtain the secret. The
leakiness of trade secrecy law is not a "bug" of trade secrecy law, but rather a "feature" which needs to
be preserved if trade secrecy law is not to become a super-strong patent of unlimited duration.
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